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SIDELIGHTS.

I. ON SIDELIGHTS IN GENERAL.

By EMERITUS PROFESSOR FRANCIS ANDERSON, M.A., LL.D.,
University of Sydney.

PHILOSOPHERS have not waited for Einstein to discover the relativity of all things, not only to each other, but to the mind that perceives or knows them. The search for the Absolute, in the old bad sense, was a great game, but could not last. Like the "Hunting of the Snark", it has its attractions and its dangers. Lenin and his followers are confident that they have found the Absolute in their sense. Mr. Hilaire Belloc and his like declare that it has never been lost, and that they are its proud possessors. Metaphysicians, however, have become more modest in their claims to construe the universe according to their theories. Defeated but not dismayed, they have not lost hope. They are ready to change the plan of campaign, to learn from the adversary, to gather wisdom from the lips of babes and sucklings, and from men of science who know no philosophy. Dogmatism is out of date even among mathematicians like Mr. Bertrand Russell, who defines mathematics as a subject in which one never knows what one is talking about, or whether what one is saying is true. Mr. Santayana tells us that "pure logic, clearly conceived, turns out to have no necessary application to anything, and to be merely a parabolic excursion into the realm of essence". Philosophy from of old has sought to know the reality of things, but the idea of universal essence leaves us even colder than the three incomprehensibles which Christian theology once tried to substitute for one incomprehensible. Theology will never cease to formulate and elaborate, to eviscerate, to evaporate. It continues to live a shadowy life in the cloister and the classroom, but it is the saints and not the theologians who keep the church alive. Philosophy has been kept alive, not through the abstractions of philosophers, thrown off in their pursuit of an ultimate and indefinable reality, but through their gleams of insight into realities which were definable and values which were realizable. Sham universals give no help

to the soul in time of trouble. The verbal or logical synthesis of the True, the Beautiful and the Good in one single and supreme value leaves us in a mental fog where all values disappear in a common greyness. What we know of goodness, truth and beauty is derived from the sidelights we meet with in our walk through life. Shall we not add that these supreme values themselves are sidelights, revealing the nature of the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God. We can define light and colour "in the abstract", from a physical or physiological point of view, but we know them only by finding them in the "broken lights", in the colours of the rainbow and the glories of the sunset. Can we by searching find out God? Philosophy lives on and in the search. Primitive philosophy, like primitive religion, found guidance in all sorts of queer ways, and followed strange bypaths. The author of the Book of Job relied on the hippopotamus to silence the patriarch and show forth God's glory. Oriental and medieval Philosophy have begotten metaphysical monsters, not yet dissolved into thin air. Plato, the great spiritual wrestler with the angels, the divine "ideas", had to confess that of all the images by which the mind tries to body forth the unseen, "the best in this sort are but shadows". Shadows in a sense they may be, but not a vain show. No sidelights can give to us the fulness of the beatific vision, yet through the guidance they vouchsafe, the philosopher, like the saint, *endures, as seeing Him who is invisible*.¹

To see life steadily and see it whole is not given to mortal man. It is aspiration, never attainment. The words, though spoken by one poet of another, by Matthew Arnold, of Sophocles, are suggestive rather of the cold scrutiny of science, the unimpassioned attitude of philosophy. Yet life in its fulness baffles both of these. Science slices reality into sections, and "murders to dissect". The philosophic synthesis of the whole ends in metaphysic. The metaphysician, tired of abstractions, seeks contact with reality in the mystic vision. But to the plain man, both metaphysical schemes and mystic flights are so many excursions into the regions of the unverifiable.

"Art still has truth, take refuge there", to quote once again from the modern apostle of sweetness and light. When science and philosophy fail us, we turn from diagrams and

¹ Sir James Jeans, in "The Mysterious Universe", finds in mathematics help by the way, in trying, like Kepler, to construe God's thoughts after Him. He regards it as probable that the universe consists of thoughts in the mind of a pure mathematician. "It can hardly be disputed that nature and our conscious mathematical minds work according to the same laws." Yet the philosopher and the humanist in him is not satisfied with the cold light of the mathematical moon. He turns for sidelights to another sphere where the air breathes on us more warmly and sweetly, as in Prospero's enchanted isle. "To my mind, the laws which nature obeys are less suggestive of those which a machine obeys in its motion than of those which a musician obeys in writing a fugue, or a poet in composing a sonnet."

skeletons, dry analysis and abstract speculation to the creations of art. The aim of art is beauty, but if art is to satisfy man in his complete activity, beauty must be more than an adornment, and art more than a diversion or a profession. Beauty *reveals*, and art *creates*. "The flower of art grows only where the soil is deep." The ideal of beauty cannot be divorced from the ideals of goodness and truth. Yet idealist and realist alike fail in their presentation or representation of the truth and reality of things. Each makes his own selection, offers his own interpretation, and each, according to the other, gives us a perversion of the truth, a travesty of the facts, or a libel on reality.

It would seem impossible to arrive at the truth, the whole truth, on any subject, great or small. What then is the plain man to do? He too, in his own pedestrian way, wants to see life steadily and see it whole, to keep his feet on solid earth without losing his vision of the stars. Beauty and truth and goodness are like life. They are indeed forms of life, if they have any reality at all. They are revealed to us always in part, although they carry with them suggestions of the whole. To be satisfied with the part or the moment is to fail. "A man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for." The infinite is present to us at every moment, in every object. It is only because the infinite is in the finite, that a thing of beauty can be a joy for ever, that the prophet can speak truth, and the pure in heart see God,

that frail and mean and mortal though we be,
the deathless things in which our hearts delight
can touch us with their own eternity.

Dean Stanley, consulting Carlyle in some difficulty, asked what he "ought to do". "Do", said Carlyle, "why, Stanley, you must do the best you can." The best we can! Do the duty that lies nearest, and the next duty will reveal itself. See as much of the truth as we can, and more light will come. The road, as Tagore reminds us, is part of the goal. And so of other subjects, and so in other spheres. The part, paradoxically, seems often greater than the whole, as every student and every teacher knows.

History, Mr. Ford announces, is Bunk. If, as Fielding said, nothing in history is true except the names and dates, while everything in fiction is true except the names and dates, then let us broaden our conception of truth historical, and add to our sight insight, disdainful neither of art nor science. When Stubbs and his tribe fail us, let us turn to Shakespeare and Scott and Dumas for those sidelights on history, through which the forgotten past becomes a panorama and a pageant, instead of a valley of dry bones.

Sidelights! "I have observed", wrote Bunyan in "Grace Abounding", "that a word cast in by-the-by, hath done more execution in a sermon than all was spoken besides." Bunyan, like Cervantes, was a master of sidelights. Hence the "Pilgrim's Progress" and "Don Quixote" have been to many a man, a liberal education. When in a meditative mood we reflect on our experience, we may be thankful for the many sidelights we have had on the way, moments of vision to warn or to inspire. And when we turn to history, most of us must confess that much of the best of what we know and remember has been given to us through sidelights, high or low, broadly illuminating or intensely flashing. It is true, nevertheless, that sidelights, uncorrected, unsupplemented, may mislead, and give us false views of men and movements, such as may be found in the writings of that master of misrepresentation, Mr. Lytton Strachey. The old times are the good old times or the bad old days, according to the sidelights thrown on them by some trait of character or incident of everyday life, revealing thoughts and passions which once moved men and women, and which in turn rouse shuddering or admiring motions in ourselves. Just before the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth, the Lord Chancellor of England and the Solicitor of England (let their names be forgotten!) left their chairs to give an extra screw to the rack on which was stretched the body of a gentle Englishwoman, and this in the name of law and religion. To come closer to our own times, it is little more than a hundred years ago, since the Archbishop of Canterbury of the time, by his speech and vote in the House of Lords, supported by his right reverend colleagues and brethren in Christ, defended and maintained in existence the statute under which starving children were hanged for acts of petty thieving. It is through such sidelights on history that we are enabled to measure the distance we have travelled. What is it that has been changed—men, manners or morals? And what has brought the change about—Christ or Cæsar? The late Lord Birkenhead might have been trusted to deal faithfully with a British Bolshevik, but not in the good old way. Nor would the Duke of York ever dream of following the example of his ancestor and namesake who took a personal satisfaction in seeing that the thumbscrews fitted properly Presbyterian thumbs in the royal castle of Edinburgh.

If we have come so far, shall we not go further? Has human nature really changed? And have conditions improved so very greatly? History shows how changed conditions may lead to mental and moral reversions and social declension. Humanity may lose much of what it has gained, and may have to begin again the painful process of working out the beast. The beast we have always with us. Lest we feel too self-

complacent in our superiority to our forefathers, let us imagine the future historian seeking for sidelights on our own times. Here is one which he might find:

"In the South Side, in what has become the heart of Chicago, stretch the stinking miles of stock-yards. Dante would have recognized this world. A sunken city of blood. . . . Men move about with bloody hands and the whites of their eyes gleaming. Low sodden houses of wood. Windows tight shut in summer, in order to keep out the stench. Acid-eaten soot-stained houses, soaked with all the floating excrement of the meat-mills. In them at night, Slav and Magyar and Croat who dreamed of a Promised Land. And by day, children playing in the filth of the streets, waiting to join their parents. Over all the spirit of the place, perhaps its soul—an indescribable stench."

This scene is not, of course, described because it is American. Most great centres of industrial civilization are, in varying degree, also centres of poverty, corruption and human degradation. But if the future historian turned from the muddle and murders of Chicago, in search of some place where the modern gospel of efficiency was practised as well as preached, would he be likely to find it in Russia, in the muddle and massacres of Moscow? Light from the East! He passes to India, and finds there Mahatma Gandhi, like another ineffective Ruskin, offering as a light to his troubled brethren, the vision of every man spinning the cloth for his own garments by his own hearth. Now the unassisted labour of one Indian hand spinner of cotton is to the machine-assisted labour of one Lancashire cotton spinner as 1 is to 3,264. Gandhi's gesture may have a certain value for purposes of political propaganda, but before one little fact like that, the gospel light of his farthing candle dies down and splutters out. The modern gospel of efficiency is not to be replaced by a gospel of inefficiency. Nor is the way out of the muddle of our mis-managed industrialism to be found in a regress to primitive conditions, when men gorged in common and then starved in common. Machinery utilized and controlled may be made the means of the salvation of man from poverty and many of the vices which poverty helps to breed. To return now to the simple life by rejecting machinery—and that means the existing industrial system—would be to abolish leisure, and most of the things which make life worth living. It would destroy the possibility of the higher life for great masses of men and women. It might make man once more a beast of burden and woman a domestic slave.

But can Gandhi's attitude be dismissed so easily? Light from the East! Has the West no other answer to the East than to point to the latest triumph of industrial civilization? Has the *Deus ex machina* been found in the great god of mass-production, who will bring healing to the nations and salvation to the people? Or has Gandhi's gesture, after all, more than a local or national significance? Are not East and West together involved in a problem of cosmic or human importance in which the fate of civilization is concerned? It is possible to regard Gandhi's gesture as the symbol, not so much of Indian revolt against English rule, as of the soul of man in revolt. What shall it profit a man, if he gain a whole world of material goods and lose his own soul? I have compared Gandhi to Ruskin. The resemblance is at best a superficial one. We need no theory of reincarnation to enable us to believe in the return to earth of the saints and prophets. There is an apostolic succession, in comparison with which the ecclesiastical doctrine is a poor mechanical makeshift. Gandhi is in the direct line of succession from Saint Francis of Assisi and Jesus of Nazareth.

[NOTE.—In his next article, Dr. Anderson will deal with the problem of Production and Consumption from an ethical and sociological point of view.]

INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY.

By W. ANDERSON, M.A.,

Professor of Philosophy, Auckland University College.

II.

"The primitive government was the Matriarchate. The Matriarchate! The Lords of Creation just ran about and did what they were told."

"But is that really so?" said Ann Veronica.

"It has been proved", said Miss Miniver, and added, "by American Professors."

"But how did they prove it?"

"By science", said Miss Miniver, and hurried on.

H. G. Wells.

THE conception of community based upon the principle of co-operation, "division of labour", or specialization of function, is evidently that which lies behind the contemporary vogue of schemes of educational and "vocational" selection according to predetermined differences of innate "aptitudes". The emphasis upon this principle is by no means a new thing in human history, as a second- or third-hand acquaintance with the contents of Plato's "Republic" is sufficient to show. In this work, or in the writings of Aristotle, we can even trace the currency of such "modern" views as that such selection is really an assertion of individuality, and discover the roots of its association with the abstractly "utilitarian" conception of the State. When we are told today that "the first duty of the community is to defend itself", that before everything else it must secure its own efficiency, and so forth, we can readily perceive in such a position at least a *prima facie* basis for the contention that the modern State must graduate the educational and similar opportunities which it offers "the individual" to a previous estimate of the niche which he is permanently capable of occupying in the social or economic system. But it cannot be denied that, if our present educational and similar arrangements do not perfectly conform to this doctrine, it is not because those responsible for them have not had, for many centuries, ample opportunity to make themselves familiar with it, presented in a thoroughly competent and persuasive form.

It may be said, of course, that, even on the utilitarian view of the State and of State action, selectionism could not have acquired its present vogue apart from the recent emergence of a "psychology" which provides at last a "practical" and "scientific" basis of selection. It may be said, too, that the

spread of Darwinian ideas of evolution has played its part in elevating the method of selection into a position of primacy over other educational and governmental processes. However, it should be borne in mind that the essential ideas of Natural Selection were admittedly borrowed by Darwin from the human sphere, where they were already familiar and applied by him to the organic sphere generally; while as to the scientific claims of contemporary psychography, it should be clear that the value of the whole procedure must still depend on the validity of the conception of the community which accompanies it. This has given rise to such serious difficulties in the past that it is our first business now to see what provision has been made by the selectionists on the side of political theory for surmounting them now.

The result of such an inquiry is to show that no advance whatever has been made towards the solution of these problems. The objections encountered in Plato's "Republic" are rather multiplied. In the "Republic" we are shown the recourse of Socrates to the Pythagorean idea of idiosyncrasies as the basis of the several virtues, as well as of their counterparts in the social stratification which he envisages, at issue with his own essential rationalism. The Pythagorean structuralism is, for example, distinctly in the ascendant in the "communistic" prescription for the ruling class (that is, class of rulers)—provisions so frequently mistaken even now for a *régime* to be imposed on all and sundry. That this class—of all classes!—should be deprived of the otherwise general facilities for the acquisition of property and family life does not escape the notice of the critics of Socrates. It is in reply to their objections on this point that he advances what is now the stock "utilitarian" argument, that the good of the whole must take precedence of the interest, or good, of the several parts. No class in a functional society exists for its own sake, but only for the sake of the community as a whole.

This is as far as we can get under the guidance of Pythagorean ideas, and this is where we are left by them. It is interesting in this connection, to observe how the propaganda of the "New Education" turns for "philosophical" or "religious" inspiration to that one of the degenerate forms of Pythagoreanism now current in half-educated circles which advances under the arrogant and pretentious title of Theosophy. It should be noticed, however, how, as the Socratic thesis is worked out in the "Republic", the Pythagorean basis is quietly superseded. For—to take again the case of the philosophic rulers—as the nature and extent of the demands upon this class are unfolded, it becomes evident that neither in virtue nor in function can they be rated as a mere corps of specialized technicians interlocking with other qualitatively different elements. The same

argument which shows that it is impossible to understand the human virtues without realizing their rational unity, demonstrates that the apparently isolated "virtues" typical of the several social orders cannot even attain their normally expected degree of efficacy save when they are formed, however unconsciously, under the guidance of a single, universal and philosophical insight which must exist somewhere in the community, be it only, as Plato and Aristotle later contended, in the framework of its constitutional law. But with this admission of the representative principle, Pythagoreanism is discarded, and the way is cleared for modern democratic developments.

Turning now to the contemporary treatment of the same issue, we observe that the great defect in the idea of co-operation as a formulation of the nature of community is that it leaves the question undecided whether or not we are to recognize the operation of a common good or "general will" in the social organization. But accordingly as we can or can not do so, we get entirely different accounts of the meaning of co-operation. It may be something that implies a real mental life, or it may have no such implication. Thus parts are said to co-operate precisely through their differences in bringing about a certain result or maintaining a certain whole, as in a machine or other physical *corpus*. This, and nothing more, is signified by the utilitarian presentation of the relation of "the individual" to the community. But a machine, with all respect to Professor Whitehead, is not a community. (Professor Whitehead, it will be remembered, thinks that rocks are societies of the most stable type, because they are as far as possible removed from exposure to the disintegrating effects of thought.) To have community you must have the mental element, the apprehension of a common good, and with it the risk of criticism. Indeed, as philosophers have pointed out all along, it is the common good that is implied by and produces the criticism. This latter is a situation to express which physical analogies, like part and whole, mechanical stability and the like, are so hopelessly inept and so purely reactionary, however they may be advanced in the alleged interests of evolutionary continuity.

Given the apprehension of a common good, it is true, we frequently, and indeed usually, find co-operation and specialization of function. But such co-operation is now, like the community from which it derives, an embodiment of will, directed in consciousness to the common and universal for the sake of the intrinsic value of the latter. Community, in short, is a concept *sui generis*, irreducible to terms of any other. Indeed it may subsist in the absence of specialization of function.

On the other hand, it is only where specialization of function is incidental to community, and contains the mental implications of the latter, that the word specialization can be used in its most fully intelligible sense. We hear a great deal today about the need for specialization, particularly in the educational sphere. Some of the grounds, indeed, on which this contention is put forward, such as the alleged impossibility of achieving the kind of conspectus of all the sciences that was possible, say, in the eighteenth century, seem to me to be ready for an overhaul. But however this may be, the current demand for specialization usually means in practice a demand for the excision of one after another of the more general type of studies. But, strictly speaking, this is not specialization at all; it is merely blinkering. Surely specialization, as a word signifying a process, must mean not the ignoring, but the marshalling of universal principles for the more thorough and detailed exploration and interpretation of specific issues. Once more, in short, we observe the fatal insufficiency of physical concepts, like the inverse ratio of breadth and depth, to present any facts or processes involving mind.

Thus, again, just as we may have community in the absence of specialization of function, so we may have what is commonly understood by specialization of function without community. So far from embodying a common good, "society", understood as a mere mechanical system of slots and pigeon-holes, could not be conceived to have interests of its own at all, much less to impose obligations upon the individual. The element of mind is lacking. On the other hand, society so regarded does provide a very suitable subject for utilization by the interested outsider. The fundamental motive of many exponents of "social work", as of the schemes of "selection by individuality" which so strongly appeal to them, seems to be little better than a strong determination that people like themselves shall remain in control of the situation. As we have seen, it is of the essence of a structural system of parts to be of use to somebody else.

It is not difficult to trace out the anomalies and absurdities which arise in current thinking and planning from the adoption of structuralist conceptions of the individual in relation to the community. On the one hand we are, as we saw, referred to what is, as compared with the ethical standpoint, the "necessarily limited" outlook of the State—its "first duty" of self-preservation, and so on—for the justification of all those projects of "direct" selectionism in education and industry, which, it is urged, can and must now take the place of the older, more "indirect", approach through the test of a more or less protracted attempt to initiate the human subject into a common and universal culture. There can, indeed, be no doubt of the limitation of the proposed standpoint. From

the various neo-pedagogical devices which profess to enable "us" to anticipate or discount the judgment of what the specimen of humanity knows by the judgment of what he "is"—systems of "mental" testing, of accrediting, and the like—the one certainty that emerges is that all these schemes make uniformly for the growth of bureaucracy, with the supersession of the scholar by the administrative official. But now, on the other hand, we reflect that if it is the community which must restrict its facilities and requirements to the scale of its own necessities, of whom, we must ask, in contrast with the community, are the mere luxuries and "frills" of general culture the proper concern? The answer that is apt to spring to the lips is—"Why, of the individual, of course". But now we are sharply brought up by the consideration that it is just the utilitarian policy which claims to be uniquely guided by the principle of individuality; its own great discovery being the employment of the educational system for the strict allotment of the human subject to his proper niche in the social system solely by what he differentially is, and the subordination or supersession of schemes of common culture and knowledge. It is evident that we are here confronted by two contradictory conceptions of individuality.

The only way to avoid such intellectual predicaments and the practical difficulties which flow from them, is to give up analogies like part and whole for the relation of the individual to the community, and with it the utilitarian confusion of the individual with the particular. When, however, we present to ourselves the situation in straightforward terms of the apprehension or pursuit of a common object beyond themselves by many subjects (this being indeed what constitutes their community), we can at the same time realize that the problem which is misrepresented by expression in terms of an opposition between the interest of the whole and the claims of the part may nevertheless be a real and important one.

It is, indeed, quite impossible for community to be at one and the same time a source of obligation and, as on the "utilitarian" view, a source of demands upon the individual at a "lower" level than the behests of morality, or calculable in terms of an integrity of parts in a whole which contains no moral reference. The refutation of this heresy was understood to be the spiritual basis of the effort of the Allies in the recent world-hostilities, though the respect paid to the projects of the new psychologists and educationists since that time sometimes seems to give point to the question: "Who won the war?" But what is true is that we do have, making itself felt from time to time, an inevitable tension between the idea of what is good as entertained and enforced by "public opinion" or

"the majority" in a given community at a given time, and the conception of what is good as disclosed to the critical judgment of the individual in reflection. Now both of these elements, that of "majority rule" and that of critical reflection, are necessary to the progressive definition of the good in human experience; they are alternate manifestations of the same thing; they are equally indispensable elements in the development of human individuality. But it is of the essence of the case that the opposition must be between the verdict of public opinion that something (simply or "absolutely") is good, and the verdict of the individual critic that the same thing is not good. The situation is hopelessly muddled when "sociologists" and others break in upon it with considerations of what is good "for" this and that, or "in the interests of" that or the other. They thus merely confuse a perfectly straightforward issue with such alien and doubtful distinctions as that between "personal" and "social" goods, or between the "general interest of the community" and the "particular interest of the individual", self-regarding actions and other-regarding actions, *et hoc genus omne*. The problem is distorted to fit a scheme of knowledge of things human in which a blanket science called "Anthropology" is partitioned into an "individual" branch, Psychology, which deals with the "individual" man "by himself", and "Sociology" or "Social Anthropology", which deals with him "in association", or (God save us!) as affected by a "social environment", on the lines of the distinction between geography and astronomy. The upshot is that we get on the one hand the conclusion that the State confines itself to the guardianship of the "interest of the community" as against any "individual interests" which conflict therewith. Either the naturalistic bias of the whole position, or an ethical survival in the shape of the consideration that life in community is itself the source of obligation, then suffices to warrant the addition that the State is subject to no moral scruples in the exercise of that guardianship. Or, on the other hand, with the individual reduced to the particular, either the naturalistic sentiment that as between the particular and the universal only the particular is real, or the ethical consideration that all good must be personal, is sufficient to secure the repudiation of the State altogether as something which has been called into being to exercise purely illusory functions. The whole position becomes acutely dangerous when the exponents of this way of thinking are encouraged to proceed to set up a "political" standard of "the anti-social" as an alternative to, or naturalistic substitute for, the ethical standard of what is simply wrong. Obviously such an alternative to morality can only be another (and confessedly inferior) morality. At its best, the position

amounts to a confusion of the real distinction between ethics and law with an unwarranted and pernicious opposition between ethics and politics.

Here let us for a moment go back to Aristotle for a breath of sanity. Aristotle has a distinction between the kind of education which may be best adapted to producing a good citizen of a particular State, and the kind required to produce a good man. This way of putting the case, so far from establishing a difference between what is good "from the standpoint of society" and what is good "from the standpoint of the individual" (much less between what is good for society and what is good for the individual) is a strong confirmation of the position here adopted. For to consider man as man is emphatically not to consider him apart from community—much less apart from a "social environment". It is rather to consider him as a member of the moral community, that which consists in the common recognition and pursuit of an absolute good. But this community, we have seen, is the principle of particular communities. Indeed it is historically a persistent matter of difficulty for the members of a given community to realize that their organization is not the entire community, or humanity at large. It is this, and not, as naturalistic ways of thinking would lead us to suppose, a deliberate and explicit pressing of separate "national" interests recognized as such, that provides the primary cause of intolerance and strife in the international sphere. Such oppositions, then, as arise between particular communities and the one moral community, imply simply the historic tension we have described between the version of the good which has so far prevailed or been possible to enforce as the basis of a particular society, and that critical return upon its objective justification in the absolute good for which the legal or customary code is itself the educational prerequisite.

When, then, a man "asserts his individuality" by questioning the value of the accepted standards, or opposing the prevalent practices, in his particular community, he is only asserting it in so far as he is asserting his genuine membership of that community. Nothing could be more misleading and futile than the attempt to deal with this situation in terms of the deflection of a "part" or "organ" from its function in maintaining the "whole", or of the undue subordination of whole to part. I do not say that this latter is not a situation that can and does arise within community. I do say that it only arises within any community in so far as community itself is presupposed independently of what can be expressed by the relation of part and whole. I would add that a study which professes to busy itself with the characteristics of the members of society as parts in a whole,

but claims the right to abstract from that which constitutes their society a community, and yet calls itself psychology, or even the science of the individual, stands self-condemned.

Yet structural psychology, in conjunction with the "division of labour" conception of community, has no other terms than those of part and whole in which to treat of the situation in question. Hence it is only by an irrational compromise that it can make any concession to "the rights of individuality" in a case of this kind. Such a course is followed in Professor McDougall's theory of moral progress. According to McDougall, this is brought about from time to time by a "variation", in the biological sense, on the part of some human specimen, who then becomes known as a leader or moral reformer. In such a case the charge of failure of the part in adaptation to the "social whole" is (retrospectively) withdrawn, while the innovator in return organizes "the whole" upon a new basis, after which the enforcement of the standard of structural adaptation of the part to the whole may be resumed in its full vigour. Reason for, or in, this alternation of standards there is none that we can formulate. Yet the result is called progress!

But even this apart, the explanation of moral advance by reference to variation in the proper biological sense of the word is essentially unintelligible. Organic evolution concerns strictly the appearance of structural changes. Structure is its first and its last word. The subject of evolution in the biological sense is, or has become, different; it has qualities which it did not have before (ontogenesis), or which its ancestors did not possess (phylogenesis). A moral advance, on the other hand, is, or implies, a change of judgment. It means that the subject must be in a position to say: "This, which I formerly thought to be right, I (the same I) now, for reasons which I might specify, think to be wrong". He must be able to recognize not only his present judgment, but equally his former judgment, to be his own. His present judgment, indeed, must permit of being shown to be but his former judgment with the necessary qualifications made explicit. Now for such a development to take place it is essential that the subject should not be different, but the same—or at any rate that no substantive change in him is relevant to the change in his judgment. Further, if, as is maintained, the communication of this new moral standpoint of his is part of the progress, his fellows cannot be his mere biological inferiors. The whole position under review, in fact, is but another variant on the hoary sophism that in order to think the same you must be the same, and to think different you must be different.

Finally, while, as we saw, the mere relation of whole to part cannot begin to justify anything in the nature of an

obligation imposed by the former upon the latter, it is of some interest to trace out the real ground of the "utilitarian" maxims of the community's first duty to itself, the limitation of the State's outlook to considerations of its own efficiency without further moral scruples, and the like. For it will be found that this language, despite the "moral holidays" and other objectionable features which it suggests, indicates when properly understood a fundamental implication of genuine and objective morality. For its true basis appears precisely when we take into consideration not merely the particular historically organized community but the universal moral community of mankind as that which is given a concrete embodiment in particular communities. Such statements are, in fact, just another expression of the absoluteness of the moral standard. Frequently as they may be misused, they are even then but misapprehensions of the truth that the good is and must be its own justification. Cut away the universal community constituted by the good, and such claims become the most irrational and inexplicable of superstitions. The one thing that is without justification is the step by which people first abstract the particular political from the universal moral community, and then go on to claim for the former an unconditional authority, a freedom from ulterior accountability, which is inherent in the latter alone, and can be ascribed to the political community only by imputation from the moral. What clearer evidence could we have that this step has been taken than that the claim of "the State" upon "the individual" should be made in definite disregard of that which makes him a member of the moral community, his character as a rational being, or his participation in the life of reason?

We have now to consider the other chief misconception of the nature of community attendant on the particularist view of the individual. Whereas the "division of labour" theory held that the social unity is sustained through the structural differences of its "parts", we have now to deal with the contention that that unity is a function of their generic structural identity. Community, it is held, depends on likeness. This theory finds its principal application in the attempt to explain all social and political phenomena in terms of race and of racial differences. The promotion of this standpoint is called making history scientific. The exponents of this theory hold that the ideas, institutions and activities current in one community differ from those which prevail in another because the members belong to a different biological species or sub-species. Similarly it is explained that the rivalry and strife which subsist between nations, or would-be nations, arise directly from their differences in biological type.

It is evident here that mind is being considered from the standpoint of organic qualities, and its nature discounted to the extent necessary to make it fit into this mode of treatment. It is hard to see how anything distinctively mental can survive this handling. The fact that certain individuals recognize a common good, or live in a common world of meaning, is taken to be their mere phenomenal expression of the substantial fact that they, as particular substances, each possess certain "mental qualities". The idea of a common quality here supersedes or dominates that of a common object. If we are to want the same, we must be the same.

The destructive dialectic to which the structuralist logic of racialism leads is brought out in a very interesting way in a discussion of the racial question held some little time ago under the auspices of our sister body, the British Institute of Philosophical Studies, and reported in its Journal, Vol. I. Here it is sufficient merely to mention the title of the contribution made on this occasion by Sir F. Lugard. His paper is entitled "Are Racial Antipathies Innate?" The very posing of such a question, which is the form in which the general problem is most evident to the practical administrator, is in the nature of a turning of the tables upon the racialists. When we explain and criticize the thoughts and actions of people that we object to as being the simple outcome of what these people are "by ordinary generation", we can have no ground of complaint when this very belief on our part is traced to a similar irrational source in ourselves. Thus we should have the position that whenever a certain class of persons A is so constituted by nature as to think that some other class B is so constituted as to think in a certain way, such a class B will be found to exist. Such a pre-established harmony as this never entered the dreams of a Leibniz.

As to the prevalence of war and strife in the world, it might well seem that if we are to consider these things in connection with the likenesses and differences of men at all, a good deal of the trouble could more readily be traced to the likenesses than to the differences. For example, if men, or nations of them, are constituted alike in wanting to possess certain things of which there is not enough to go round, the result is not harmony but strife. The only way out of such a state of affairs is, as T. H. Green pointed out, that communities should find their common good less in things that are diminished by sharing and more in the things that are not so, although, we might add, this in turn would not be without influence on the distribution of "competitive goods" themselves.

The great methodical difficulty that has to be faced by the sort of "scientific history" to which I am now referring is that in order to obtain a manifestation of the inherent qualities

with which it would operate, it has to work upon the activities of actual peoples who possess a social organization and tradition. But on the other hand a race, in the proper biological sense, is no sort of social entity whatever. However far we push back our inquiries into the antecedents of historical peoples, we never reach a primitive distribution of peoples coincident with "pure races", that is to say, with distinct biological species. In order to use the word "races" of actual peoples at all, we have to change the meaning of our terms, and define a race simply as the descendants of a group. I have yet to hear of the ethnologist who is in a position to establish any advance on that definition.

It is in these circumstances encouraging to notice how anthropologists are coming to realize that the customs, ideas and actions of men in communities are not to be understood or expounded on a conceptual groundwork of substance and attribute such as prevails in biology. The relative opacity of the institutions of one community to the members of another is explicable in entire accord with the inclusion of both in the great community whose constituent object is the absolute good. It is the one human reason seeking the same good under various and changing historical and geographical conditions which has gradually precipitated the complex customary systems which we find today as the necessary and habitual framework for the development of individual virtue and actual progress. Such systems, to be understood, must be understood as a whole, in the light of the ultimate objective and of history. To try to strike a sort of average which can be enacted and enforced uniformly throughout the world, in the attempt to set up from without an abstract minimum of civilization, in the form of hygienic measures or the like, is not calculated to succeed in promoting a fuller appreciation of the universal community. It is a failure to appreciate this, as I believe, that accounts for the continued toleration by this country of the methods of its officials in the administration of Western Samoa. The common is not an average, and it is not a minimum.

The transition from our normal conceptions of life in community to the idea of its racial basis is not achieved in a single step. First, we have the reduction by "sociologists" of all forms of community to their least common factor which is signified by the word "group", a step which exhausts community of its entire mental character. A group is a spatio-temporal collection of particulars. But just as particulars form groups, so they also belong to types or kinds. The simple-minded aim of "sociology" is now to combine these ideas of the group and the kind. This is achieved by the process of reinserting the mental element, which had been excluded when the talk was of "groups" simply. This

"mental" element is, however, introduced only in a form adapted to the comprehension of the social theorists; it is in the purely structural form of an inherited nucleus of "mental qualities"—capacities, dispositions, tendencies and the like. This is called "the Group Mind", and the resulting intellectual discipline provides at least one of the meanings of the mysterious term "Social Psychology". The Group Mind, then, is the set of mental qualities which the particular members of the group resemble each other in possessing by biological inheritance. For a group to be socially significant, or even to survive, then, it must be a "like-minded group".¹

It is true that of late "sociological" writers have been fighting shy of the Group Mind. This, however, appears to have been due to a misconception. They have imagined that the Group Mind has something in common with the doctrine of the General Will, or with the view that real personality may be ascribed to States, Churches, and other forms of community in their corporate capacity. With the "mysticism" which they see in these contentions the "sociologists" will have nothing to do; they profess to take "the individual" as their starting-point in hard fact, and will recognize the existence of no mind but "individual" minds, or the minds of individuals.

There is, however, nothing in common between the idea of a "group mind" in the sense of a racial structure of dispositions, and the idea of a common mind or "general will", consisting in the implied meaning of the formally recognized objectives entertained by the individual, or potentially individual, members of a community. But the "sociologists", in the pursuit of their laudable aim of keeping to individual mind, have in fact succeeded in diverting their attention to the particular, and considered it in a relation in which nothing of a mental nature is there to be disclosed. Whereas it is precisely in the process in which the meaning of the common or objective is brought to definition, a process which combines the aspects of discipline and of realization, that mental life consists, and that individuality is achieved. It is

¹ This is the term employed by Professor G. E. G. Catlin, a typical "sociologist", throughout his recent work "The Principles of Politics". The assumption is that likeness, a typical relation of the objects of mind to each other, can be extended to mind itself. The normal meaning of "like-mindedness" in the English language is, of course, pursuit of like objects. But this latter conception is an ultimate. To argue that it depends on an underlying similarity of mental "stuff" is on a par with the contention that to perceive a succession we must have a succession of perceptive states. In any case the only way to establish the existence of "like-mindedness" is to demonstrate a similarity or identity of objects for different subjects, but then the predication of like-mindedness adds nothing to what has been adduced as evidence for it. All it does is to facilitate a series of literary exercises and the publication of many books. This looks like being the sad fate of the movement to establish "the social sciences" on a similar basis to that of the experimental sciences of nature, and to supersede the existing political philosophy, whose "purely literary" character provides the most frequent and the strongest term of abuse in the vocabulary of its would-be supplanters.

indeed doubtful if we should speak of mind in the plural at all (save in the sense of intentions or purposes, as when we say: "I was in two minds about doing that.") It is not a case of individual "minds", but rather of mental life as the principle of individuality. But it is just this idea of a meaning to be realized that is signified by such terms as "general will", "common mind", and the like. As for the allegation of mysticism, the boot is on the other foot. It is the theorists of the "group mind" who have to understand by community an entity that is substantively different from the being of its members. For exponents of the "general will" community is the pursuit or recognition by individuals of a common object.

A typical consequence of failure to make allowance for the mutual opacity in detail of communal systems of ideas or institutions which are rational in themselves is to be seen in the currency of the belief that "half-castes" suffer from an innate mental and moral inferiority to members of either of the "pure" parental stocks. The least consideration of the traditional function of community in the development of individuality will show how brutally unnecessary is any such interpretation of the facts. When in the very bosom of the family, where the demands of the wider community are presented to the individual in what Aristotle would call their "first actuality"—that is to say, in a formal fashion which postpones the matter of their rationality for subsequent realization—when even thus early the individual is faced with the conflict of cultures, it is surely evident that the element of irrationality in these demands is raised to a maximal power. When we consider further the extent to which the belief in question is actually held in both societies (for the "lazy hypothesis" of hereditary character is always the easiest to grasp), the wonder is that the least force of character should ever survive such conditions at all. Give a dog a bad name and hang him. Perhaps the best commentary on this doctrine is to be found in the circumstance that the same people who maintain this opinion, when they hear of the attainment by some member of the "backward races" of mental or moral distinction, promptly extend themselves to show that the individual in question has a strain of European blood about him!

Both of the structuralist views of the nature of community, then, are incapable of providing a tenable account of human individuality or of reconciling it with community. The selectionist schemes associated with them are nothing but a suppression of individuality, based as they are on the extrusion of mind or will. But what, we might well ask, prevents such doctrines being put aside as gross errors or misconceptions? The answer lies in the fact that today they are buttressed by a philosophy which represents it as our duty to make them

come true if we can. It encourages people to persist in the attempt to apply them in spite, or even because, of their discrepancies with humanity's normal modes of thinking about itself and its activities. The very fact that words like "reason", "will" or "self" appear to indicate fixed points of reference for our thinking makes of them just the sort of thing, it is held, that science has always progressed by liquidating. We have to reckon, then, with pragmatism in its ultimate naturalistic form.

According to this theory the only element of any significance in what has hitherto passed as the development of human knowledge is the experimental procedure of the physical sciences. This, it is held, can be disencumbered from all its traditional dialectical settings, and set up for pursuit as the unique and sufficient source of knowledge on all subjects. As it is represented, the essence of the scientific procedure everywhere is that a problem is encountered, a theory is advanced to meet it, which in its essence consists in the forecast of the result of a certain manipulation of the elements of the problem, and finally this is checked by, or its "validity" is enjoyed in, the result of the actual manipulation. The exponents of this view of knowledge as a whole are thus led to maintain that the growth of knowledge can only come from the multiplication of problems that admit of manipulative treatment, and that the only theories worth considering are those that afford a basis for prediction of the results of manipulation.

Now as what we can do with our hands is limited to putting things together or dividing them into parts, it follows that the sort of knowledge we can get in this way is comprised in the collocations or sequences of spatial and temporal units and things that are fundamentally affected by these. Thus every topic that is to be made the subject of "scientific" knowledge must be capable of representation in terms that stand mutually in purely spatio-temporal relations. To these all other relations must be reduced. Such a reduction of the outstanding disciplines is what we see professed in contemporary psychology and "sociology", and it is in favour of this that "literary" methods and conceptions of meaning and value are rejected as unscientific or pre-scientific.

Now, of course, we are all familiar with the attack on ordinary materialism, which takes the form of pointing out that the physical interpretation of things implies an interpreting subject that acts on other than purely physical principles. The philosophy before us, however, professes to have forestalled this objection. It makes the claim that its spatio-temporal version of reality embraces the scientific procedure of mind itself. Knowledge also is to be shown to be a characteristically temporal relation of events. For, working with the familiar

notions of hypothesis, prediction and verification in isolated sufficiency, and ignoring or accepting as final the well-known logical defects of verification, this philosophy contends that truth is a matter not of "static" concepts of agreement or of adequacy, but of temporal succession. It consists in the temporal relation of a present manipulative concept to a future experience—an event which is an organic adjustment followed by an event which is an "enjoyment".

This attempt to reduce logical relations to spatio-temporal relations must be pronounced an unmitigated failure. What happens when a scientific "prediction" is verified is not simply that a certain "experience" follows its formation. There must be in the moment of verification a perception of the agreement between the event and the expectation, a realization that the event is as it ought to be. But this agreement is precisely what has to be treated of by any theory of the nature of truth or knowledge. Nothing whatever is gained by following the pragmatists in placing it in the future instead of the present; the concept of truth remains unreduced.

Nor is the theory any happier in its attempt, by its insistence on the problem as the true starting-point of knowledge, to reduce knowledge to terms of the "stimulus-reaction", or "reflex arc" formula of physiological psychology. The "stimulus" of a problem differs entirely from a physical impact, inasmuch as to have a problem you must have a surprise, an anomaly, an apparent exception to what is general. But obviously this means that you must have actual mental life and the apprehension of universals as a presupposition of the problem-solving activity. A man who knows nothing can have no problems.

We thus see that this philosophy, which claims *par excellence* to breathe the spirit of science, ends by giving a wholly inadequate account of science itself. With all the emphasis that is put upon "immediate experience", "sense-data" and the like, and the claim that universals have been reduced to mere transitional and instrumental constructions, it is only an outsider's view of scientific procedure that is obtained. The inner meaning is lost. As a complete philosophy of knowledge, "scientific method" is suicidal. Yet it is precisely through the inadequate ideas we have just discussed that this philosophy would convey its vaunted message of science to education and politics, and seek to effect their revolutionary transformation in respect both of content and of method.

In its isolation of the formation of hypotheses as the one distinctively mental operation, emphasizing as it does the complete difference of kind between this operation and the terminal experiences between which it forms the bridge, the theory exalts intuition at the expense of reason. We have

lived to see the word "creation" most on the lips of the advocates of naturalism. Here, then, we find the philosophical basis for all those educational projects which reject instructional methods and prescribe a direct confrontation of the learner by "concrete" facts and problems, leaving him to express his "individuality" by formulating for himself any universals, laws or principles that may help to solve the problem. And, of course, "Nature", besides being the only true teacher, is the sole and sufficient examiner.

Original research, then, is the only sound educational method, "right from the kindergarten to the university". But again, since the whole justification of mental effort lies in removing the problem, it becomes quite a secondary consideration whether the principles by which this is done are formulated or not. Communication, the sole legitimate object of such formulation, is a relatively insignificant by-product of the process of discovery; it remains impotent to generate fresh knowledge. Intelligence, then, is more important and fundamental than intellect or reason. Thus the "fact-loving", "hand-minded" followers of Professor Dewey.

But again, the naturalistic conception of individuality is enforced by the emphasis on intuition in another way. Taken by itself, the formation of hypotheses has an appearance of spontaneity; there is something unprecedented about it; and hence, considered exclusively as the essence of mental activity, it appears to provide a direct revelation of the innate capacity of the particular subject, enabling us to discount the influence of instruction, memory or tradition. From the exclusive stress upon the finding of solutions we get the promotion, as substitutes for the ordinary examination, of "intelligence" tests, with their reliance on the finality of "right" and "wrong" answers, or the devices of the "New Examiner" with his pulverized problems, as direct roads to the soul of the pupil. Or, extending the privileges of intuition to the estimator as well as to the estimated, we get the advocacy of systems of accrediting for further educational opportunities. Surely, we are told, the mentor who has lived in intimate contact with the subject for so many years must be in a superior position to do justice to his "individual" capacity, than an external adjudicator whose brief, formal approach is made through a mere impersonal body of knowledge!

The great objection to all these schemes, as to the philosophy on which they rest, is that they disregard the distinction, signalized so long ago by Socrates, between true knowledge and "right opinion". Pure experimentalism, with its sole criterion of "working", can attach no meaning to a need for "knowing that we know". Yet it is safe to say that the whole educational aspect of knowledge is comprised in this need.

This consideration is as applicable to education on the side of its criteria as on that of its content. Here is no extraneous valuation for ulterior purposes. However it may be in the economic sphere, in the world of mental activity and development acquisition without realization is meaningless. The individual who is given no opportunity to show what he knows by his procedure in the marshalling of the principles he has acquired in the solution of the specific problems he is set, cannot properly be said, and is not permitted the opportunity, to possess the knowledge which he seems to have. He does not know what he knows. "Mental" tests which go no further than the computation of the proportion of "right" answers to "wrong" ones in the solution of isolated problems, in the ulterior interest of determining mental "structure" apart from the interests and life of knowledge, miss the whole educational function of the examination as we know it; they neglect the element of individual self-realization. And so with the teacher. It is all very well to talk about his superior opportunities for knowing by acquaintance the true calibre of his pupils, but that is not the question. His problem is not merely that of knowing in the sense of "being right", but of knowing that he knows. What steps can be taken to obtain this result save by securing the verdict of a third party, as authoritative as can be got, with all the accompanying risks of disagreement. I think we must conclude that until the "new methods" of instruction or of examination cease to select isolated parts of the educational problem, and face it in its whole complexity to at least the same extent as the "traditional" methods, the latter must hold the field. Meanwhile we have need to recur to the Socratic distinction in order to break down the vicious opposition between discovery and communication which has been foisted upon us by the experimental philosophy.

The objection we noted at the outset to the maintenance of a common school curriculum, on the ground that the latter is incompatible with a regard for the great range of "individual differences" of mentality, we can now see to be merely a consequence of understanding individuality in the sense in which it excludes the common. But supposing that the common curriculum is, in the light of the new knowledge of these differences, now an absurdity, we must remember that such differences, if they exist now, will always have existed. Thus we are faced with the question, not merely how it is that the system has contrived to persist, however imperfectly, for so long, but how it managed to get into operation for a single day.

The critics of the system may try to argue, of course, that it never has been in operation. They will say that the surface appearance of a common achievement is produced by a

systematic recourse to verbal *formulae* as distinct from genuine first-hand learning, acquired by a process, stigmatized as "cramming", which operates so as totally to disable the half-wits who conduct public examinations, from picking out those who really know from those who really don't.

One might at this point pause to ask these ultra-scientific scorners of the word if they have never had this experience. Have they never found, at one time or another, that some formula, for whose availability they were indebted to early memorizing, all at once on the appropriate occasion burst forth into a flood of meaning, illuminating a whole range of experience? Is not this, indeed, a fundamental law of all our learning, that our reach must ever exceed our grasp? Is it not a principal function of language and of rote-memory in our mental economy, to enable us to retain what has first been passively and formally understood, in readiness for the later experience which will give it its proper filling, and lead to adequate realization? While psychologists at least pay lip-service to the advance signaled by Ward and others (not forgetting Hamilton long before) in showing that mental development is not from a manifold to a unity, but from a vague whole to an articulated whole, the educationists, in their "new" theories about the need for starting with concrete particulars, things and not words, and so on, are maintaining, if they only knew it, a purely reactionary position.

If, as the "new" educationalists contend, the child must fully understand and realize each step that it takes, I fear that it will never learn much. The following citation from Professor Bagley ("Determinism in Education", p. 146) is ominous:

"At the Cleveland meeting of the National Society for the Study of Education in 1923, the present writer suggested that if this official discrediting of knowledge by 'educators' went much further, the only way to get facts into the child's mind would be through 'bootleg channels'. . . . I have known classroom teachers to apologize when 'caught' doing some real teaching. They have said in effect that they were well aware that they ought not to do it—that they should get results by indirection, development projects, or what not—but that they felt that their pupils needed on this occasion a little direct instruction. I confess that I have never 'reported' these self-confessed sinners to the authorities."

This last misrepresentation of the reality of common achievement is, however, but a symptom of something more deep-seated. The objection to the common curriculum is in the end one more offshoot of the old sophistic contention that to think the same you must be the same. And, as the Greek sophists made no bones about admitting, but rather contended, this position is simply incompatible with the existence of any communicable truth or knowledge whatever. While on the other hand, if there be such a thing as real knowledge, there

must be something in the nature of mind which is radically incommensurable with what can be expressed in terms of the differentiating qualities of particular subjects or substances. If it be true that $2+2=4$, the knowledge thereof is the same in Jew as in Greek. What is common knowledge to A and B cannot by any difference in their qualities be more common to A than it is to B, save in the world of Irish bulls. If in place of the apprehension of principles we take perception, the participative character of mind is revealed to the same effect. Each of us in this room obtains a different visual projection of the shape of the top of the table on my right. Do we therefore conclude, in the light of these "individual differences", that there is no common object present? On the contrary we realize that it is precisely because, from our different positions in the room, we get visual projections of the table-top of correspondingly different shapes, that we are all seeing the same object. If we *did* all get the same visual projection in spite of our differences of position, it is then that we should have reason to think that our minds were differently constituted.

Now it is just such an apprehension of the common that the common curriculum exists to promote. What its opponents have to show is that the differences they say they have found are such that this cannot be done. But if they could show that, it would mean, not that the children have differently constituted minds, but that they have no minds at all. This last, I regret to say, is the impression left on myself by most of the current educational projects.

Let me say here that nothing in what precedes can rightly be understood to be in opposition to the demands for the opportunity of greater individual attention in the schools of this country. The proposal to reduce the size of classes as a means to this end I would not dream of challenging. But, as I understand the matter, the greater individual attention that is required does not mean attention to hypothetical structural idiosyncrasies, but (as our illustration from perception may perhaps suggest) attention to the varying problems of actual content which each individual encounters, as and when these problems arise for him. And, indeed, until we can get individual attention in this sense of the words, so far is the common curriculum from being discredited, that it has not yet had a chance to show its possibilities.

One might dwell at great length upon various schemes of reform in educational method which are characterized by the repudiation of the universal, and thus in the name of individuality put up a barrier against its own attainment. There is, for example, the proposed "ego-centric" teaching of History, as I might be allowed to call it, which in the name of "individual

research", repudiates all instructional methods as dealing in mere frameworks. History is to be studied, not for its own sake or for its characteristic discipline, but to instil "scientific method", teach evolution, and the like. This can only be done if you start from the "immediate", the annals of your own particular *milieu*. Here we recognize another consequence of the blindness of experimentalism to the eternal dialectic from which all research arises, and into which all research returns. History in particular, as the inquiry which aims at the explanation of actions as purely as may be in terms of actions, can have no meaning for the experimental philosophy. Yet it is just to such an interpretation of events that the records of the acts and "dates" of kings and queens, and of their wars, so much despised by the "new historians", are the means. If the new historians want to do something really effective, they should set about showing the exercise of personalities in and through the "social forces" of whose superior importance they profess such strong conviction. It would then be interesting to see if the historic "figures" who finally emerged would be very different from those who dominate the pages of "mere political" history. But as it is these "historians" confine themselves to agitating the peculiar contention that economic trends and the like are somehow easier to grasp, closer to "the individual", and more noticeable both in themselves and in their causation, than are individual policies and purposes. In addition, the whole assumption that our knowledge starts from our bodies and their present condition, and gradually extends outward in space and time, is just as radically false as that it starts at the confines of space and time and works inwards. Mental beginnings are always "in the middle", and lead on from the formal to the real.

Closely connected with the pedagogics of the New History is the doctrine of the inefficacy of what is called "formal training". We are told, for example, that the agility you acquire at tennis will not serve you in dodging the traffic. Similarly what you learn about triangles should not help you to understand other plane figures, what you learn about plane figures to deal with solids, nor what you learn in geometry to comprehend the processes of algebra or trigonometry. Here is another denial of universals, a repudiation of the systematic character of knowledge. I cannot see that there is much to add to the refutation of this doctrine long ago by Socrates, when it was being propagated by the Sophists. Socrates showed that this non-transferability applied just to those things that were not rationally learnt or taught at all, but were the product of knack, imitation and repetition, that is to say, where there was no apprehension of principles and thus no basis of communication. Knowledge unites men, skill divides them.

However at the present time the theory in question seems to be by way of getting dislodged even from its chief stronghold, the facts of animal learning, at the hands of the "Gestalt" school in psychology. Even the lower animals, it would seem, respond to universals.

Just a word here on the matter of a well-known official propaganda in favour of a reorientation of this country's educational system by the introduction of the so-called agricultural bias. Its chief interest for my present purposes concerns the association with it of the well-worn plea for the recognition of "individual differences". On the face of it, the two things are quite distinct, if not antagonistic. For the advocacy of an "agricultural bias" seems rather to aim at shaping the individual for a certain groove than at deferring to his peculiarities. It is then merely the rejection of what is alleged to be the existing groove in favour of a different one, and thus the proposal seems to belong to the moulders' rather than to the fitters' branch of the educational machine-shop. To commend it on the strength of the rights of individuality looks like a rationalization, in the bad, or Freudian, sense of the word. Considered as an attempt at "moulding", it deserves the observation that if there is a disinclination among young people to "go on the land", it is just as likely that this is due to what they know as to what they are or have been made. And it must be clearly understood that it is nothing in the nature of the subjects themselves that are studied at Grammar Schools that causes their pupils to want to adopt professional careers.

But what lies behind the propaganda, and explains the reference to "individuality", is the sweeping classification of "natural" individualities into two exclusive "types", based on such a current division as that of the two sorts of mind, the intuitive and the reflective. Herein we see the characteristic logic of the whole position at work; the crystallization of functional differentiations into structural differences. It is then argued that the form of education which aims at eliciting the common is exclusively suited to the reflective "type", while it can only divert the "intuitive" from the true direction of its self-realization, for which the appropriate preparation lies in practical training of some sort, "manual" or other.

I pass over here the allied proposal to substitute training for rational education as having greater value for the subject's "future life", this last being taken as an absolute datum. This is no more than a translation of the feudalistic cry so often heard in older countries against "educating" the mass of the people above their proper station in life.

I am, however, concerned to urge that the external classification of minds into reflectives and intuitives is a very dangerous basis for practical schemes. When we look at knowledge, as we ought, from the inside, we find intuition and reflection so intimately connected in the smallest cognitive act that they can only be regarded as correlative aspects of the same process. Intuitive in dealing with what?, Reflective about what?, we must ask. The practical point is that no division of types of education will prevent the so-called intuitive from reflecting, at his own times and in his own way. If his reflection has been starved of its proper guidance, it can only be expected to take violent and unbalanced forms. It is often supposed that lack of general education can be compensated for later on by schemes of Adult Education. With all respect for what these have accomplished, I do not think its results will carry conviction of its capacity to carry such a load as is now suggested, to unprejudiced consideration. Has any scheme of adult education ever turned a crank into a sane man? Then on the other side, the canalizing of the "reflectives" into a separate educational channel has equal dangers. Young people are allowed to reach the age of the average university student at graduation without having incurred the responsibilities for self-maintenance which their developing nature demands. The result is bound to be trouble. For this reason I venture to think that the widespread condemnation of the admission of the part-time student into the New Zealand university system has been unduly hasty.

At the very least the advocates of such schemes as those now being agitated in the domain of public education should have made some attempt to estimate the extent to which the occurrence of the various "types" corresponds to the openings for them in the existing, or probable future, economic system. Current talk about "aptitudes", indeed, confuses under a single head two different things. We may mean a total aptitude for a whole occupation or mode of life. But even granting that such things exist, we should only have even utilitarian justification for constraining the national educational system to the confirming and emphasizing of them, if there happened to be in all cases a permanent place for their bearers in the existing order. But is it reasonable to suppose that whenever modern industry evolves a new occupation, the good God sends into the world just the right number of souls with the corresponding equipment? This would be an effort of Natural Theology to whose heights not even the Bridgewater Treatises contrived to rise. On the other hand, we may mean by "aptitudes" particular "knacks" of various kinds. In that case we should have to recognize that such things are capable of entering into and being made contributory to the greatest

variety of schemes of life, whether "professional" or "technical", and thus subordinated to will and reason. The recognition of faculties of this sort could afford no justification for a system of preparatory educational grooves. In our own field of philosophy, we constantly observe how its investigations are advanced by workers who approach it through widely different interests—literary, artistic, historical, mathematical, physical. These they carry into their philosophical work as "points of view" without failure—rather to the increase—of mutual intelligibility, and to promote the solution of the common problems.

The readiest test of the presence of an adequate conception of individuality will be found in the place it is given in the formulation of the ends of human effort. For man, we have seen, individuality is a continual achievement rather than a datum. But we find something more. Students of ethical literature are familiar with what is known as the "paradox of hedonism"—that if pleasure is to be obtained, it must not be expressly pursued. But in truth the case of pleasure is only one example of a more general predicament. One of the main tasks in the due ordering of our lives consists in the defining of those things that call for deliberate cultivation, in distinction from those which are best left to care for themselves. Individuality, then, considered as an end, is one of these things like pleasure. Its deliberate cultivation, in the striving after originality and similar forms, bespeaks a wrong conception of its nature, and is destructive of the possibility of its own attainment. Rather is individuality achieved by devotion to the objective and universal. Reason, then, is the ground at once of individuality in man and of his community. What Divine Reason has joined, let no man—no Government, no Education Department, no Chamber of Commerce—put asunder.

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY, AND "THE TESTAMENT OF BEAUTY."

By RICHARD LAWSON, Litt.D.,
Professor of Education, Otago University.

"The Testament of Beauty" by the late poet laureate follows an old literary tradition—it attempts to combine science, argument, proof, philosophy, with poetry. One cannot read a page of it without being reminded of Lucretius and the "*De Rerum Natura*".

Lucretius begins with atoms and the void, proves—or attempts to prove—that the soul is material and hence mortal (*animus per se non quit sine corpore*, III, 554), deals with simulacra or images, then with the universe as having birth and hence being mortal too (*mortali consistere corpore mundum*, V, 65), then with the evolution of society, and finally deals with phenomena of the heavens and of nature. Dr. Bridges, in his metrically presented conspectus of man's biological and psychological ascent from naturalism to ethicism, begins in his first book with man's "sensuous intuition", and his dissatisfaction with Nature owing to his vision of a diviner principle implicit in life. His second book deals with Selfhood:

Hav I not learn'd that Selfhood is fundamental
and universal in all individual Being;
and that thru' Motherhood it came in animals
to altruistic feeling, and thence-after in men
rose to spiritual affection?
Powers unseen and unknown are the fountains of life
.
. Reason, our teacher in all the schools,
owneth to existences beyond its grasp.

Just as he here asserts that Selfhood arises out of unknown sources, so in Book III he asserts that Breed, which "is to the race as Selfhood to the individual", is an instinct of sex whose origin "lieth yet in thatt darkness where all origins are". Breed and Selfhood are a pair, growing, the former, through Reason up from animal rage to war and gluttony and yet from motherly yearning to a profounder affection, the latter from brutality up to the altruism of spiritual love—the necessary attractions are innate in both Selfhood and Breed, to be finally transfigured through love to beauty. Finally, in Book IV, Ethick is dealt with, as Reason maps out the science of conduct,

and thatt Science, call'd Ethick, dealing with the skill
and manage of the charioteer in Plato's myth.

A composition of this kind necessarily depends for its cogency upon the knowledge and the reasoning in it, that is,

the labour is of the scientific or philosophic kind. At the same time the author, like Lucretius, has beautified his composition with a series of colours, rhythms, pictures and assonances which make use of knowledge only to give background and coherence to their content, the object in these being, as in all art, to please, to give sensuous exaltation, to intoxicate the reason rather than to persuade it.

As a rule, the great poets avoid this blended style of composition. In Homer there is poetry pure and simple, with its kindred element of drama. Of Virgil the same is true; there is in the "*Æneid*" no philosophy, unless one gives the name of philosophy to the doctrine of the "*anima mundi*", the soul of the world, which is expounded in connection with the descent of Æneas to the Underworld. But Virgil does not present it as a philosophy elaborately argued and fortified with references. He presents his doctrine rather as an immediate penetrative apprehension of the universe, though no doubt he derived most of it from some mystic religion. Dante employs the poetico-philosophic method fairly freely. Milton does also. Wordsworth, of course, is philosophic, or at least reflective, in the great bulk of his poetry. Goethe, as a rule, keeps philosophy away from his Muse. French poets belong mainly to the non-philosophic school. As a general judgment, I venture the opinion that the combined method is ineffective, and that wherever the great poets have departed from the pure function of poetry they have ceased to be themselves and have lost their hold on their readers for that reason. Boethius followed a better principle; his reasonings are in prose, his rhapsodies in metre. For instance, when he turns his gaze to the starry firmament he deserts his prose and bursts out—

O stelliferi conditor urbis

Qui perpetuo nixus solio.

(Creator of the star-strewn sky

Who sittest on Thine eternal throne on high).

Plato must have been strongly tempted to write his visionary myths in verse; for, when he has pushed philosophy to its limit, he leaps into the region of intuition, like the true artist "*immer am Ziel*", and there he hears what no gross ear can hear and sees things invisible to mortal sight. Poetical prose is the highest form of prose: prosaic poetry is the lowest form of poetry. Aristotle never reaches the highest kind of prose because he has not the ear for the inaudible symphonies.

"Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
are sweeter."

His "Poetics" gives everything that can be given by analysis about poetry, but the volatile spirit of poetry escapes him

and is evaporated ere he is conscious of its presence. One who knew nothing of poetry except what he learned from the "Poetics" would know as much, or as little, as one who had gained from "Hamlet" only what could be offered by an English dictionary, or from "Tannhäuser" only what could be gathered from a text-book on sound-waves.

Dr. Bridges in his Introduction, which constitutes Book I of "The Testament", lays down the thesis that wonder is the beginning of art, science and religion:

"'Twas late in my long journey, when I had clomb to where
the path was narrowing and the company few,
a glow of childlike wonder enthrall'd me, as if my sense
had come to a new birth purified, my mind enrapt,
re-awakening to a fresh initiation of life."

(I, 7-12).

And again later on:

"This spiritual elation and response to Nature
is Man's generic mark. A wolf that all his life
had hunted after nightfall 'neath the starlit skies
should he suddenly attain the first inklings of thought
would feel this Wonder: and by some kindred stir of mind
the ruminants can plead approach—the look of it
is born already of fear and gentleness in the eyes
of the wild antelope, and hence by fable assign'd
to the unseen unicorn reposed in burning lair—
a symbol of majestic sadness and lonely pride;
but the true intellectual wonder is first reveal'd
in children and savages and 'tis there the footing
of all our temples and of all science and art."

(I, 318-330.)

This ascription to wonder—and also to dissatisfaction with Nature—of the spiritual achievements of man is probably right. It is certainly right poetically and religiously. It is the true baptism for every spiritual enterprise. The poet enters into his new world through wonder. He stands with wild surmise silent upon his peak in Darien, looking and listening. The crude magma of delight fermenting within him has to be kneaded into forms recognizable and utilizable by those who have not been in Darien. The overwhelming experience has to be æsthetized and to some extent intellectualized so that those who understand by reason may at least understand it cognitively, even if they cannot fully enjoy it æsthetically. Knowledge of this intuitional nature is only knowledge when it is recognizable by others as such. Now, my main contention is that no analytical disquisition, no graded ratiocination, no intellectual demonstration of such experiences can possibly be poetry. Poetry is the presentation, not the analysis, of the experience. Wordsworth may expound his theory of poetry as "sensation and emotion recollected in tranquillity", and imagination as "reason in her most exalted mood"; but the

less the severance between the experience and the recollection, the more vital the poetry. The *Gestalt*, the Schema, the Idea—call it what you will—arising under the stimulus of wonder is a kind of ecstatic adoration. A meshwork of pictures, a confusion of sweet sounds, a gradual fusion of picture and sound—some magic alchemy transmuting the mind's eye to the mind's ear and conversely—and a transversion of the product into language whose rhythms are still intimately related to the first pulsations that supervened upon the motionless wide-eyed wonder, then after the god has passed the subjecting of the fused product to altering, and shaping—not of fundamentals but of parts for coherence and inner consistency,—this is poetry. The poet does not argue; he knows. His fundamental statement may be absurd, it often is. Consider Shelley's "Skylark":

"Hail to thee, blithe spirit!
Bird thou never wert."

He absurdly tells us that a bird is not a bird; that things are not what they seem, and that we are listening to an unbodied joy, and we believe him; for his experience is presented in pictures, music, rhythms and words so consistently and artfully fused as to simulate for us the experience he has himself had—and we believe the enchanter who tells us that the skylark never was a bird, but a spirit!

The passage on spiritual elation already quoted from Dr. Bridges is, of course, fairly entitled to be called poetical rather than philosophical. However, the remoteness of it from the immediacy of a transcript from experience may be seen by comparison with an analogous experience related by the sub-man Caliban:

"Be not afeard; the isle is full of noises,
Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not.
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments
Will hum about mine ears; and sometime voices,
That, if I then had waked after long sleep,
Will make me sleep again."

Here there is no analysis of the wonder-causing phenomena—only musical and pictorial representation. But perhaps a more decisively philosophic passage from "The Testament of Beauty" will reveal what I regard as the structural defect in all such types of poetry:

"If so be then that Reason, our teacher in all the schools,
owneth to existences beyond its grasp, whereon
its richer faculties depend, and that those powers
are ever present influencing the unconscious mind
in its native function to inspire the Will, 'twould seem
that as the waken'd mind fashion'd to'ard intellect
so the dark workings of his animal instincts
faced in a new perspective to'ard spiritual sight;
and thus man's trouble came of their divergency.

(II, 803-812.)

This and what follows it might be prose—it is prose—from a text-book on psychology: all the elements of poetry are absent from it. In this the laureate resembles his model Lucretius. (I may note *en passant* that the Latin quotation from Virgil's "Georgics" prefixed to "The Testament" embodies a Lucretian phrase, "*percussus amore Musarum*", "smitten with the love of the Muses". No doubt the English poet chose this quotation as embodying the mixed ideal, Lucretius plus Virgil, so evident in the poem.) Had Lucretius presented his atomic theory of the "*semina rerum*" in prose, he might have been the first and only Roman philosophical thinker. No doubt his mind was neither wholly poetical nor wholly philosophic. Here is one of his poetical passages, a favourite with all Lucretians and quoted in part in Latin by Lord Haldane in his biography. It is from the opening of "*De Rerum Natura*", Book II—"Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis"—

"Sweet, when the great sea's water is stirred to his depths by the storm-winds,
 Standing ashore to desery one afar-off mightily struggling:
 Not that a neighbour's sorrow to you yields dulcet enjoyment;
 But that the sight hath a sweetness, of ills ourselves are exempt from.
 Sweet 'tis too to behold, on a broad plain mustering, war-hosts
 Arm them for some great battle, one's self unscathed by the danger:
 Yet, still happier this—to possess impreguably guarded,
 Those calm heights of the sages, which have for an origin Wisdom."

This is pure meditative poetry, and what follows it in the ensuing fifty lines is better still. And after these follows a cold douche of philosophy or science:

"Come, then, and mark how seeds primordial form
 Created things, and how, when formed, dissolve:
 Their force, their action, whence, and power to move,
 Pass and repass through all th' immense of space.
 Doubtless no substance boasts a bond within
 Indissoluble, since each gradual wastes,
 And in the lapse of time flies off entire
 By age o'erpowered."

And so it runs on, a Latin text-book of evolution from the "*primordia rerum*" and the "*vacuum*". Of course, in the case of Lucretius, there is a reason no longer existent for the combination of song and information—the poet anciently was a teacher; Hesiod writes his "Works and Days" with utilitarian ends; Virgil gives practical hints on viticulture and bee-keeping in the "Georgics." But the need for that type of teaching in verse has departed; only the need of teaching of the "*vates*", the "seer", remains in verse.

It would be very easy to illustrate how Milton lost his perspective of the panorama of universal Man when he descended from the rôle of Satan—

“Hurled headlong flaming from the ethereal sky
With hideous ruin and combustion down
To bottomless perdition, there to dwell
In adamant chains and penal fire”—

to the rôle of a Puritan divine upholding freewill—

“He left it in thy power; ordained thy will
By nature free, not overruled by fate
Inextricable or strict necessity
Our voluntary service he requires”,—

and much more to the same effect. How art thou fallen from poetry, O Milton!

Wordsworth, as an intuitive poet, gives us in “*Toussaint l'Ouverture*” some of the finest lines in English:

“There's not a breathing of the common wind
That will forget thee; thou hast great allies;
Thy friends are exultations, agonies
And love, and man's unconquerable mind.”

When he loses his vision and begins to philosophize, he writes:

“And further, by contemplating these forms
In the relations which they bear to man,
He shall discern, how through the varied means
Which silently they yield, are multiplied
The spiritual presences of absent things
Convoked by knowledge.”

This poem is well-named “The Excursion”. I could go on to illustrate this from Alfred Noyes, from Dante and others; but I have already gone far enough, *mortuum flagellans*.

In conclusion, let it be said that, lest I should seem to belittle “The Testament of Beauty”, I have the greatest admiration for its lofty seriousness and for the many beautiful passages of Lucretian poetry in it. To redeem the monotony of this article, I close with a fine piece of poetry from “The Testament” that invests science with the rosy light of Apollo:

“Science comforting man's animal poverty
and leisuring his toil, hath humanized manners
and social temper, and now above her globe-spredd net
of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic,
and disclosing the secrecy of the reticent air
hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands
spiriting the dumb inane with the quick matter of life:
Now music's prison'd raptur and the drown'd voice of truth
mantled in light's velocity, over land and sea
are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear,
into every heart and home their unhinder' message,
the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood.”

(I, 722-733.)

As a postscript, I may add that the poetry of science has yet to be written. There are signs of it in Tennyson, in Browning's "Caliban upon Setebos", in some of Masfield's sonnets, and in the "*Hommage à Pasteur*" by M. Charles Richet.

CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY.

By H. TASMAN LOVELL, M.A., Ph.D.,
Professor of Psychology, University of Sydney.

THOSE of us who belong to the despised Victorians think of character as being built steadily from year to year by the Home, the School and the Church through discipline and the nurture of the sentiments. The present generation, however, is demanding freedom from discipline, freedom to use its own intelligence upon its moral problems. Now, these are two very different systems of training for character; and, while it has become the fashion among "moderns" to deride the old system, it can scarcely be said that the new way has been altogether successful. Neither private loyalties nor the public interest seem to be well served in general since we came to rely upon the individual's own initiative and own intelligence. The divorce courts tell a woeful story of the failure of the vaunted "modern" to make the necessary private adjustments; and our politics are nothing if not an expression of failure. Nothing but character, founded upon inner allegiance to the best one knows, can exercise the necessary compulsion upon the wayward wishes of individuals and so lead to observance of private loyalties and of the public interest. The Bishop of Chelmsford said recently: "The churches are the factories for the turning out of Christians—men and women with finer characters than the non-Christians round them: and the goods we deliver aren't up to specification." It may be worth while, then, to consider briefly this subject of character-building.

As one knows, the original meaning of the word "character" is that of "a distinctive mark". But a distinctive mark implies stability or consistency: obviously, one cannot ascribe a distinctive mark to what is *not* distinctive, to what is evanescent or very variable. The mark which should in that case distinguish a being today would tomorrow be inapplicable. The welter of separate sense-perceptions, emotions and impulses, which make up the mental life of a little child, do not constitute character. Rather is it a certain kind of organization of these which leads to stability and consistency, and which results in strength of character.

But even strength of character is not enough. For a criminal may possess as much: his whole life may be an organized outlawry, a strong and constant rebellion. The fact

is that character may be good or bad, as well as strong. And this ethical quality of goodness would seem to appear when, in the hierarchy of ideals, those are placed highest which have the greatest moral value. We know, of course, that there is a difference of opinion about the order of importance of the various ideals (one man will starve before he will steal, another will steal before he will starve), that this order differs with different individuals, with the same individual at different times, with different peoples, and with one and the same people at different times. But once such an order of the ideals is established, whatever that order may be, it will determine quite definitely the character of the person concerned.

The raw materials from which character is formed are the instinctive impulses; the natural emotions connected with those instinctive impulses; and reason or intelligence. Of the two systems of training already mentioned, the one, through discipline by wise elders, induces control of the instinctive impulses and nurtures the natural emotions into the suitable sentiments of good breeding and character; the other, through freedom of the intelligence of the growing person, leaves him to work out his own salvation, or damnation.

It is the instincts and the natural emotions to which those instincts give rise that establish the continuity of man with the rest of the animal world, and that constitute what is called our "lower nature". But it would seem that the practical moralist should approach human nature with a liberal understanding, with an all-embracing patience and sympathy, such as we find evinced to all young people by the Christ, by wise parents and by all great educators, such as Pestalozzi, for example. One should not too early and too thoughtlessly apply the terms "good" and "bad" to the human nature with which the building of character has to begin. Such an attitude will only prejudice the work. Until a child has been spoiled by unwise suggestion and stupid treatment, probably not one of its impulsive acts is the outcome of evil intention. Again, judged not by the motive but by the result, the greater number of those impulsive acts can do not the slightest harm and should meet with no opposition, for it is through these natively harmless, even generous, impulses that the child develops its organism and gains experience for its mind. But there are, too, impulsive acts which will produce inconvenient results either for the child himself or for the group in which he lives. Even these impulses, however, can often be allowed after modification (for example, the noise made by happy children may be inconvenient to adults and have to be suppressed, but that same noise will not be inconvenient and will not have to be suppressed if made in the children's own playing quarters;

or, again, the natural impulse of children to handle objects may become both inconvenient and costly where the objects are valuable possessions of adults, but that same tendency to handle objects is not only not inconvenient and costly but educative and beneficial if exercised in the children's playing quarters upon suitable materials wisely provided for the child to shape and form). Finally, there will be impulsive acts whose results will be deplorable, for instinctive impulses evolved for a life of nature are certain often to be irrelevant to a life of culture. Even if impulsive acts do provide us with our only motive to action in the beginning, yet many of them must of necessity be either modified or inhibited; that is to say, they must, for the good of everybody concerned, be brought under the control of reason and common sense, perhaps of the best opinion of the time, or of the best opinion of all time.

Licence granted to the emotions turns them to passion, for passion is only very intense emotion. When the mind is overwhelmed by the flood of organic sensations which pour in upon it in a state of passion, the individual is swept away. The object of his passion has so mastered him that there is no attention left for those ideal reasons which might counteract the impulse now about to discharge itself. All ideal considerations, all memory of consequences, all wisdom, all width of survey are excluded, simply because there is no place for them in a mind completely beset by passion. Passion is therefore a concern of the moment, and reduces the universality and the balance of personality to a pin's point. It is the temporary annihilation of self or personality, the destruction of all wisdom, prudence and reasonable calculation. That is the real reason why passion is degrading, why self-control is a necessity for those who desire the higher goods of life such as intellectual clarity, the beauty of peace, and moral soundness. However strongly some thinkers may urge freedom for the individual to develop his powers without restriction from "interfering adults", it is obvious that emotion must be restrained, and only disciplined passion allowed. A good instance of disciplined passion, of passion in the service of high things is perhaps the following: "Mr. Gladstone's unapproached supremacy as an orator", says the late Hon. G. W. E. Russell, "was not really seen until he touched the moral elements involved in some great political issue. Then, indeed, he spoke like a prophet and a man inspired. His whole physical frame seemed to become 'fusile' with the fire of his ethical passion, and his eloquence flowed like a stream of molten lava, carrying all before it in its irresistible rush, glorious, as well as terrible, and fertilizing while it subdued." There you have the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, not now, however, seeking blood and revenge,

but consecrated to the service of high things. It is now shot through with the fine texture of intelligence and devoted to the interests of a lofty moral sentiment. It is thus that the high life of civilized man becomes a web of sentiments which are organizations of primitive emotions in the service of loftier ends and of remote good.

Valuable, therefore, as individuality is, individuals must learn self-control, must conform to some extent, otherwise decent social life would be impossible. If you point in reply to the geniuses who have become great by nurturing their individuality and by refusing to conform to social and moral requirements, then I would reply that few persons are geniuses after all, that genius has a way of asserting itself even when it conforms to the demands of decent breeding and to the claims of morality, and finally, that if, which I fervently hope we shall be spared, geniuses were plentiful and all of them were to take this way of the spoiled and petulant child who must have its way, then society would have to pay in disorder and discomfort and unhappiness a price altogether out of proportion to the value of the greatness the geniuses would have brought it. What the genius reveals explosively and spectacularly would probably come to light in its own good time without him by the accumulation of modest contributions to insight. Therefore let us not talk facile nonsense about destroying individuality. It can, of course, be destroyed by illiberal philistines; but it is not destroyed so easily as is imagined, and certainly not because of the exercise of a little restraint. A little restraint exercised for a short while during the early life of an individual can scarcely efface the inborn capacities of heredity. The raw material of individuality must be compelled to take on form, just as the artist forces a chaos of pigments into a picture, or the composer a chaos of sounds into a symphony. To get beauty, whether in a picture, a symphony, or a character, we must insist on form. And to get form we must in some measure coerce and compel. Not that all coercion brings beautiful form, which, of course, is the justification of the argument against coercion when that argument is justified, as it sometimes is. When, however, the coercion results in beauty of form we have artistic creation. And why such a result should be achieved in a picture, a poem, a statue, a symphony and not in a character, why one should coerce or discipline paint and not passion, passes the comprehension of anyone who is not obsessed by a fanatical regard for freedom at any cost. Freedom, alone, leads to rank formlessness except in the highly intelligent. Freedom, to be productive of good, must be chastened by a reasonable discipline. Still, the discipline must be reasonable. An unreasonable discipline is, I should say, worse than untrammelled freedom;

and that seems to be the reason why it is so much easier to make out a case for untrammelled freedom than for unreasonable discipline.

Now what we have said seems paradoxical. We began by urging freedom for the child's impulses, and here we are contending for formative discipline. But this seems to be just what we have to do. As parents and guardians we are to proceed justly and wisely. We are not to assume that the child's nature is evil to begin with, nor yet are we to sit idly by and watch that nature develop rankly without giving the child the benefit of our experience. The difficult task we have to perform is to combine freedom with formative discipline. But, in training children, too often our fixed habits, our irritability, our impatience usurp the place of our intelligence, our common sense, our serenity, our self-control. Nothing can render easy the task of combining freedom with formative discipline: it demands strategy, in which we must resort to reflection as well as to codes.

In the course of his impulsive activity the growing human being experiences various emotions and makes his transition to cultural acquisitions. For the emotions come to be felt for human objects and meanings as distinct from the merely natural objects which stimulate the instincts of an animal. The child grows more and more conscious of meanings. For example, it learns to fear not only sudden loud noises, but the dark, people, places, objects. So does it come to be angry at them, wonder about them, feel tenderly towards them, elated about them. After repetition of these emotional experiences the child comes to have a "disposition" to be afraid of objects, persons, places, to be angry at, to wonder at, to be disgusted with, tender or submissive towards objects, persons, places, and meanings. The child is then said to have emotional "dispositions" which, after all, are only emotional habits. These emotional dispositions are not actual emotions, for the child is not always feeling the emotions concerned; only when the object, or person, or place, or meaning appears or is thought of does he actually feel the emotion. He is, however, all the time *disposed* to feel the emotion, even when he is not feeling it. Thus he comes to have emotional dispositions or habits which he has acquired by nurture as distinct from those which he shares with the lower animals by nature. And, be it remembered, the chief agencies which attend to this nurture of the dispositions, this process of mind culture, are the Home, the School, the Church, and the Community in general.

Later, a number of these emotional dispositions congregate about one object, person, or place, or about the idea of one object, person, or place. Such a congregation of emotional dispositions is called a sentiment. In the sentiment the crude

emotions have entered into the service of an idea. Any idea which has thus enlisted our emotions in its service is an ideal. A sentiment for an idea ensures a profound interest in that idea and guarantees action for it. So, when we have developed a sentiment for our home, school, church, or country after much living with it, much experience of it, we are prone to feel tender at the thought of it, fear when it is menaced, anger when it is maligned, wonder at what it will do or at what is to happen to it, and so on. Similarly in the world of abstract ideas, when we have developed a sentiment for freedom, or goodness, or beauty, we feel tender towards it, fear when it is threatened, anger when it is impugned, elation when it survives, and so on. Thus it is that we may have sentiments for wealth, for power, for fame, for skill, for eloquence, for scholarship, for home, school, church, country, empire, for cleanliness, for reputation, for honour, truth, beauty, goodness, holiness. Each of these ideas has then become an ideal, a cultural and spiritual value. It is sentiment alone which makes a person live or die for an idea.

As we grow to be persons, then, we come to have as the substance of our personality a number of sentiments. These sentiments are our "interests", mark our allegiances, and indicate the extent to which the raw material of personality has been worked up into the service of culture and civilization.

Now, different persons have more or less different sentiments. Again, in one and the same individual sentiments may on occasion conflict with each other. For example, a person with a sentiment for wealth as well as a sentiment for honour finds himself in the position of being offered a bribe of money to do a dishonorable deed. Now, we could predict what he would do in that situation only if we knew which of the two sentiments were the stronger, and that no third sentiment were supporting either. If there were no such third sentiment, and we knew that the sentiment for wealth were the stronger, we could predict that the person would take the bribe and act dishonorably, even if afterwards, through the belated operation of his weaker sentiment for honour, he had the grace to feel some remorse. On the other hand, if the sentiment for honour were the stronger, we could predict that he would refuse the bribe and act honorably. If one were asked what makes the one or the other sentiment the stronger, one would reply that their relation to the person's self-esteem, or self-regarding sentiment, seems to determine the relative strengths of the other sentiments. For in all men a master sentiment tends to grow about the idea of the self, but the self-regarding sentiment which results is not the same for all persons. For example, the self-esteem of one person is painfully hurt if he should be unskilful enough to be caught *in flagrante delicto* by the police, while it is elated if he proves

his skill by carrying out his *coup* successfully. For another person, self-esteem is hurt if he is not prominent at social gatherings, while it is elated if he is invited to occupy a foremost place where perhaps he may even be photographed for the newspapers. For a third person, self-esteem is hurt if he finds himself feeling glad at being prominent at social assemblies, for he has a sentiment of hatred of what he calls snobbery ; while his self-esteem is elated if he has successfully resisted snobbery.

These examples show that the main ideal we have for self will determine the relative strengths of the other sentiments. These other sentiments will tend to take up subordinate positions in the personality according to their relation to and their contribution to the self-regarding sentiment. They thus come to fall into some sort of pattern of subordination. As the self-sentiment grows firm and settles into a habit of life, the pattern of the sentiments tends to become stable, providing the character of the individual. The man whose main aim is a rich self, will have a different pattern of the sentiments from the man whose main aim is a learned self ; the man whose main aim is a socially well-placed self, will have a different pattern of the sentiments from the man whose main aim is a thoroughly reputable self ; and the man whose main aim is a successful worldly self, will inevitably have a different pattern of the sentiments from the man whose main aim is other-worldliness. It seems right to say, then, that the different sentiments are differently emphasized in different personalities. This emphasis tends later to become fixed into a habitual pattern, "characteristic" of the person ; and his destiny now rests with his character.

But if there are so many possible arrangements of the sentiments, how are we, how is anyone to decide which should be the master sentiment, or the main aim of the self-regarding sentiment?

This question introduces the other factor in the development of character and personality, namely, intelligence or reason. The parent or guardian must use it in educating for character, and the growing person himself must learn to use it. An adequate personality implies not only proper sentiments, but also the capacity to think for itself : a person in the complete sense should be able without prejudice to make an intelligent judgment on the facts and face the truth even when it hurts. The capacity to do this is itself perhaps the supreme test of character, for new truths revealed by unprejudiced judgment may thoroughly disturb the repose that has resulted from the settled pattern of the sentiments. Even good and sound men are not always equal, as they ought to be really, to the readjustment that is then required. Emerson recognized this

special difficulty when he said: "God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take which you please, you can never have both." For myself, I think this is to make the alternative between truth and repose too hard. While it may be true, as a brilliant Frenchman remarked, that we should never allow ourselves any habit except the habit of continually rehabituating ourselves, yet a relative repose is surely possible, in spite of the corroding effect of intellectual analysis and unprejudiced judgment. The body of truth discovered by intellectual activity is continually growing, and upon that body of truth we can find ourselves at rest, even though new discoveries of the intellect call every now and then for the temporary restlessness of readjustment. It seems obvious, then, that sound character building must face this apparent dilemma between truth and repose. It cannot, merely for the sake of repose and as is the practice of the supporters of many established systems, religious and other, refuse the readjustment, however inconvenient, which intellectual advance is for ever requiring. The most man can hope for is relative repose, for "the way of salvation is hard" and the spiritual life for ever strenuous.

If this view of the growth of the human spirit be the true one, then those training for character cannot be content merely to nurture the sentiments, important as that nurture is; they must also courageously train the growing person to think fearlessly, to confront the facts bravely, to live by the truth as well as by good habits: *magna est veritas et prevalebit*. No matter how the truth may hurt at the time, it is by the truth that we must ultimately live, whatever the cost.

To be able to train a child to live by truthful thinking, we must let it have the facts upon which to form its judgments, let it have the reasons for actions when those reasons come within the scope of its understanding. Personally, I can see no harm accruing from giving to the child reasons for a course of conduct, whenever he is able to understand those reasons, but rather a great deal of good. It is entirely to the child's advantage to be brought to realize the facts of a situation in which he is to act so that he may act aright out of his own judgment and so develop in moral freedom, personal standing and self-respect. If, for example, an unspoiled child has shown natural greediness in consuming the only sweets or fruit that were to hand, it is not a difficult matter to make him feel ashamed merely by bringing home to him the facts that his parents and others whom he loves have had none, though they always share their titbits with him. The natural feeling of shame which arises from the clear recognition of these facts will give rise to a judgment upon himself and will dispose him to act differently on a subsequent occasion. The judgment

is a moral judgment, and he has made it himself upon the facts. He is not merely going to do the right thing because he has been told to do it, or ordered to do it, but because he has decided to do it of his own accord. Such an experience is searching, reaches right to the centre of his moral self and is the most effective means of training for character.

It will be said, perhaps, that this is a counsel of perfection and impossible as a general rule in practice. One does not admit this altogether. However, it must be granted that the immature child is unable to comprehend the reasons for certain behaviour which may rightly be required of him. In such a case there would seem to be no good reason for postponing the development of good breeding and good habits until the child *can* comprehend. There is some truth in the adage that "as the twig is bent the bough's inclined", and there seems to be no sane reason for withholding from the child the benefit of our mature experience in living. To withhold that valuable experience from the child in the interests of an academic freedom, would seem to be the pursuit of an almost fanatical course, a course in which one would display an almost pathetic allegiance to intellectual freedom in scorn of the natural growth of sentiments which is always going on quietly amid the seclusion of the child's emotional experiences. If we always wait until the child can comprehend reasons, we may wait too long, to find that, in the meantime, other undesirable habits or sentiments have established themselves as part of his growing character.

It is upon this question of the respective rôles of intellectual freedom and the deliberate development of sentiments that there has tended to be a good deal of disagreement. That disagreement is today perhaps greater than ever. The disagreement seems to exist between the orthodox moral and religious educators on the one hand, and the advanced intellectualists on the other; and there is a good deal to be said for and against both.

Those who pin their faith to the development of proper sentiments by suggestion, precept and example, while rather fearing the effects of freedom of thought, find no difficulty in deciding what is the Good and what are good sentiments to nurture. They proceed confidently to train young persons into the possession of those sentiments and into the pursuit of that Good. They appeal to revealed religion, to creeds, to codes of morals, and perhaps to the general consensus of opinion about what is ethically right. They are shocked by the iconoclasm of the "advanced" intellectualist who questions all their fixed beliefs and all their standards, who looks askance at them for not leaving the growing mind alone, for not leaving

it to find out Truth and Good for itself, and who even reduces life to a flat, stale and unsavoury condition by denying the existence of a world of values at all.

Now with these abused orthodox persons one finds oneself greatly in sympathy. They have at least the good will and the aspiration after goodness. Whatever may be said against well-meaning persons, it cannot be denied that to have the good will is also to have made a very good beginning. Still, it must be admitted that the good will is not enough; and well-meaning persons have often done considerable harm, as is seen, for example, in the degradation wrought by indiscriminate charity.

It is this effect of the unintelligent, uninformed good will, no doubt, that the cynical writer, the Honorable Bertrand Russell, had in mind when writing his sceptical essay on "The Harm that Good Men Do". In this essay he shows unquestionably that many "so-called" good men, men who are vapid, shallow and unintellectual, do actually much harm, and that many "so-called" bad men work much good. Yet his contentions are grossly unfair. To begin with, he chooses his own definition of the "good" and the "bad" man, which are subversive of their true meanings. If the "so-called" good man is not good, then he is not good; and the "so-called" bad man is good, then he is good. But that does not in the least affect the goodness of pursuing good, nor does it impugn in any way those who do pursue it. From this point of view Russell's argument almost reduces itself to humbug. His is the criticism of the intellectualist; and his example shows that the intellect is not always so reliable an instrument as those who depend upon it so strongly would have us believe. But we shall return to this point almost immediately.

Before we do so, it must be said that it is the height of hypercriticism and intellectual vanity to refuse to acknowledge that we have learned much from ages of living, from centuries of moral endeavour. Surely, since the first primitive tribe tried the effect of taboos up to the present, we have come to know something of what is good to do, without being under the academic necessity of sitting down to think out *ab initio* what is good and right. If we have not at all learned what is good to do, then there must have existed in everyone but the Hon. Bertrand Russell and a few other of the *élite* among intellects, a very microscopic amount of intelligence, regarding intelligence as the capacity to profit by experience. With such a view, observation prevents me from having any sympathy whatever.

Nevertheless, it is profoundly true that some moralists are cursed with a narrowness of sentiment which is stifling and shot through with error. Morals never can be severed from truth without detriment to morals. Along with the good

habits of the moral character must go the open-minded intelligence, ever ready to make room for and adjust the character to new truth as new truth is progressively revealed. The difficulty of doing this is apparent from the way in which scientific truths are being continually rejected by many otherwise good persons. One admits the difficulty, and the danger, of this continual readjustment of one's character, this habit of continually rehabilitating oneself. Man wants rest and peace; and there is little rest or peace for him who takes the strenuous road of intellectual inquiry.

Having said so much for the use of intelligence in the development of character, let us return to the question of the competence of the intellect in this regard. Here it must be admitted that even great intellects do not avoid error altogether, though they discover some new truths. Indeed, so notable a thinker as the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, relegates the intellect with its lifeless analysing to a secondary place, to a place subordinate to intuition and the great movement of life itself. Still, it can be retorted that the errors of individual intellects will be corrected in time by other active intellects, if we but go on appealing to and using intellect as our means of discovering truth and what is good and right to do. And this retort seems to be justified, though perhaps many may suffer for the errors before they are corrected.

But there is another weakness of the intellectual instrument which is generally overlooked, and which is quite impossible to overcome, at least as matters stand at present. This weakness is that intelligence, like height, weight, musical ability, retentive memory, and most other qualities of the individual, is not given to everyone in equal measure. One not only cannot, by any magic known to man, turn an ordinary intellect into a genius; but, furthermore, one cannot turn a defective intelligence into an ordinary one. The fact, from which not one living psychologist would dissent, is that intelligence is a capacity which ranges, throughout the many individuals composing the population, from idiocy, through imbecility, mental deficiency, sub-normal and normal intelligence, to superior intelligence, very superior intelligence, and even to genius. As an individual's degree of intelligence is determined by his native constitution, one cannot alter the grade into which he is born (except in certain cases of glandular deficiency) no matter what one does, no matter what the system of education. About one per cent. of the population are mentally deficient according to certain authentic standards of measurement; a great many more are sub-normal in intelligence; the majority possess normal intelligence; a few are superior in intelligence; a few are very superior; while one or two, now and then, are to be classed as geniuses.

In such circumstances, where is the sense in refusing to train children by moulding habits deliberately ; and where is the warrant for relying solely upon intellectual freedom, and leaving the child to his fate ? The proposition is absurd, whatever high place we may be prepared to give to intellect in the business of forming character. Even on the score of intellect, the older intellect has a greater store of experience at its disposal, to which the child is heir and to which he has a right. Personally, while supremely interested that children should be trained to the exercise of their own judgment, I should think that the withholding of that experience from the child would be a crime.

In conclusion, it would seem that the way of the educator is hard. His task appears to require that he should not only have the good will, but that he should try to combine the acquisition of good tradition with the development of moral judgment through dispassionate thinking. It seems no wonder that we often fail, or that there are, on the one hand, extremists who advocate a narrow traditionalism, and, on the other, extremists who advocate complete freedom for the child to find its own way to moral character, if it can.

MODERN ADVERTISING.

By R. SIMMAT, M.A.,

Research Manager, J. Walter Thompson (Australia) Pty., Ltd.

BEFORE the Industrial Revolution in England, under the domestic system of industry, goods were mostly manufactured in the home, for home use. Any surplus was either sold to neighbours or exchanged for other goods which the family required. Under this system it was rare for goods to be sent even from one village to another.

With the Industrial Revolution in England, manufacture was transferred from the home to the factory. In the factory large quantities of goods were made. These goods were distributed locally at first, then nationally, and finally, in the last fifty years, internationally.

With the development of a centralized system of manufacture, there developed the necessity for a systematized method of marketing the products manufactured. Under the old system, goods were manufactured and sold locally to people who knew all about them. Modern conditions of mass production make it essential to sell the goods manufactured to people who are, perhaps, thousands of miles away from the factory, and know little about them.

Advertising and travelling salesmen are the only means by which news about merchandise can be spread from one town to another, from one country to another. Advertising enables the soap manufacturer, for example, to regard as his legitimate market every country where people wash or ought to wash; the shoe manufacturer to have as his market every country where people wear or should wear shoes; and so on.

Many business men have tended to regard advertising as a luxury—something to be indulged in because it is the fashion. Sometimes business men, having suddenly discovered a surplus of profits, decided to spend that surplus on advertising.

The consumer has tended to regard advertising with suspicion. If a line of goods has been advertised extensively, the consumer has concluded that the cost of this advertising has been passed on to him. He thought that, if the line were not advertised so much, he would not have to pay so much for it. These conceptions have gradually faded from the minds of business men and from the mind of the consumer. Advertising has come to be regarded as of special service to the community. It is by means of advertising that the housewife “way up country” comes to know about bargains in the metropolitan store: if she did not read of these bargains in the daily papers,

or in a catalogue, she would know nothing of them. In brief, advertising has brought merchandise before the notice of the consumer. It tells him what to buy.

As the result of this tendency to tell the consumer what to buy, advertising has enabled the manufacturer to expand the markets for his products. With increasing demand for his products, the manufacturer can introduce methods of mass production. These methods of mass production enable him to reduce the cost of manufacture and to pass on this reduced cost to the consumer for each item of merchandise.

To look at the position, however, from another angle, it would seem that the consumer is being pressed by advertising to buy merchandise, to spend money, when perhaps in the minds of many he ought to be saving it. According to this idea the consumer simply exists so that the manufacturer can produce more goods to sell to him. In reply it may be said that advertising has contributed to the development of our civilization. If it were not for advertising, few of us would ever, for example, have refrigerators in our homes. If it were not for advertising and reading what other people have in their homes, we would not know what furniture to buy. Advertisements tell us where to go for our holidays, tell us how to care for our feet, our complexions and our hair. Advertising places before us the claims of rival food products, so that we know what is available and can make our choice. Advertising teaches the consumer what he needs for his well-being, and tells him how to get it. If it were not for advertising, I believe we should still be living in cheerless homes, without refrigerators, without radiators, without all the material home comforts which are so dear to us. We would still be wearing shoes that did not fit us, and, possibly, not even be cleaning our teeth regularly because we had never seen those terrifying advertisements which tell us how many germs lurk in that film on our teeth.

Advertising helps the manufacturer in that it increases the demand for his goods and so enables him to introduce mass-production methods. The benefit from this is passed on to the consumer in the way of less costs for goods manufactured.

The public as consumer and as a market for any product may be classified into four groups:

- (1) Those who definitely know what they need, and where to get it.
- (2) Those who definitely know what they need, but do not know where to get it.
- (3) Those who know what they need, but who do not know definitely.
- (4) Those who do not know if they need the product at all.

With the group who know what they need and where to get it, advertising can do very little ; with the second group, consisting of those who know what they need but not where to get it, advertising can only direct them where to get it. The position resembles a man looking for a job and going to the "Positions Vacant" column in the *Herald*, or a man wanting a Used Car and reading the classified Motor-car Sales column. The third group, who have only a vague notion of what they want, offers more opportunity for advertising. Those who have a notion they want tea offer an opportunity to sell X's Tea by advertising. Those who have an evil-smelling breath offer an opportunity to sell Y's product for removing it, and so on. The fourth group, consisting of those who do not know what they need, provides the greatest scope for advertisements, which, first of all, must educate them to the fact that they need a specific product, and then proceed to make them realize that Y's product is just the one they should use.

Each of these groups requires, broadly speaking, a specific type of advertisement. For those who know what they need but not where to get it, the simple classified advertisement is often sufficient. Those who have a vague idea of their needs but no specific idea of what they should get to satisfy this need, constitute the largest group of consumers. The type of advertisement used to appeal to these is known as "Competitive Advertising", which aims to persuade this type of consumer to purchase Z's product in preference to Y's or B's. The group who do not know they need anything have to be educated to the use of a product by advertising, and this type of advertisement is known as "Educational Advertising". It aims to develop, first, the use of the product, and later, to persuade people to use a specific brand of that product. The ideal advertisement is probably a mixture of the competitive and the educative type. People are already educated to use products like tooth-paste. Still, companies like Pepsodent find it wise to educate people to the dangers of a film on the teeth, and, at the same time, by competitive advertising, to stress the advantages they believe Pepsodent has over all the other products. Flour is a universally used product and probably demands more stress on the competitive factor. Still, for a period some years ago, manufacturers spent a lot of money educating people to new uses of Self-Raising Flour. That done, the various manufacturers of Self-Raising Flour proceeded to stress the value of their own particular brand.

Many modern advertising men still rely on inspiration or on a "hunch". The popular conception of an advertising man is probably that of someone who sits back in a room and smokes ounces and ounces of tobacco, and from these ounces and

ounces of tobacco gets a great idea, which he puts forth in the form of an advertisement which takes the country by storm. It is true that many of these great ideas originating in this way were quite a success, but, on the other hand, a great many of them were not.

Modern Advertising, by substituting the scientific for the inspirational, has made advertising less and less of a "hit and miss" affair. The old "great idea", brought forth by much labouring and tobacco smoke, was expensive, in that one did not know actually whether it was going to be a failure or not. A modern scientifically evolved idea behind a scientifically evolved campaign is not a "hit and miss" method at all: it is one that is guaranteed one hundred per cent., or almost one hundred per cent., for accidents will always happen. We have not yet perfected the scientific technique of evolving an advertising campaign, but we are approaching the ideal nevertheless, and we do know that a scientifically evolved advertisement is not a haphazard shot at a market: it is a shot carefully directed right at the market, a shot which we know is going to have a very great effect on the market.

Let us assume that a modern Advertising Agency has been entrusted with the responsibility for advertising a product. They will immediately proceed to apply scientific method to the solution of the new client's problems. Scientific method involves three steps prior to the formulation of any advertising and merchandising plan. The first is *the collection of facts*; the second is *the analysis of the facts collected*; and the third is *the graphic presentation of these facts*.

The facts themselves may be gathered from various sources: from the client himself; from the past experience of the Agency in dealing with similar products, or possibly even the same product, in other parts of the world; or from published sources, such as Government statistics, research bureaux, libraries, or trade journals. Information may also be obtained from experts, from experts in the professions, such as doctors, dentists, dieticians, or else from merchandising or manufacturing experts. The Trade itself can supply quite a lot of information about the attitudes of dealers, trends of sales, publicity and marketing methods, and sales resistance as represented by competitive products. The consumers themselves, of course, supply the greatest fund of information, as the consumer is the person who buys and uses the product in any case. Information obtainable from consumers discloses who buys the product; whether men buy it, or women buy it; whether poor people buy it, or rich people buy it; what quantities of it these people buy, whether they buy it in pound lots, or half-pound lots, or packets, or tins; what prices they pay for it; where they buy the products, whether from grocers,

chemists, or departmental stores ; when they buy it, whether at the end of the week, or every day, or every month ; why people buy it ; what they use the product for ; what other similar product they use, and so on.

From this collection of facts, it is possible to get together basic market data, to determine the suitability of the product for the market concerned, to determine the copy appeal, to determine which newspapers and magazines should be used for advertising, and to determine marketing policies and sales quotes.

Let us consider the exact procedure. From Government libraries and other sources, it is possible to obtain the regulations and restrictions relating to importation, production and sales, further information relating to imports and domestic production, to show trends, and it may also be possible to obtain information about consumption, how consumption varies in different districts and in what seasons most of the product is consumed.

This information affords a background, and the next step is a conference with the client. At this conference, the history of the product, the history of the client's organization, the client's production-strength, the client's previous sales policy, and, in fact, all the available data about the client's business are obtained. This Plan and Data Meeting, as it is called, is no small task. It usually takes about a day, and those representing the Agency are the Account Executive, the Copy Chief, and the Research Manager, with any other person on the staff of the Agency who might be interested. The client usually has his Sales and Advertising Managers present to assist him. It is customary to have a set group of questions formulated. The answers to these are taken down by shorthand writer, in full. The Report of the Meeting represents a very important contribution to the basic data which the Advertising Man has about his client. Throughout it all, the client is asked to take the Agency into his complete confidence, just as a patient takes a doctor into his confidence, or an accountant is taken into the confidence of a business man. This confidence is not misplaced, nor can it be used to the disadvantage of the client, because modern Agency practice is that no Agency will handle two similar types of product. The belief behind this is that no Agency can serve two masters, in that no Agency can do full justice in advertising two similar products.

The next step is to obtain direct contact with the point of view of the consumer and that of the Trade. There is only one way to do this—talks to the consumer and the Trade about the product. These talks are standardized in the form of a set *questionnaire*, and investigators are sent out to call upon consumers and the Trade with these *questionnaires*.

Often many thousands of consumers are called on ; in many instances, it is not possible to call upon the actual consumers, so *questionnaires* are sent by mail. The number of completed *questionnaires* required varies according to what may be considered a representative cross-section of the community.

Consumers are asked how they use similar products ; what they think of them ; when they use them ; who uses them ; how they use them ; and so on. A representative cross-section of the Trade is asked about main competition, possible selling and advertising schemes, margins of profit expected, prices, and so on. In addition, investigators often go out and actually sell the product, and note what the people buying it have to say. Experts are given samples of the product to taste and to analyse chemically.

All the data accumulated in this way are analysed. It involves much labour. This is known as the Engineering aspect of Advertising, and it will now perhaps be understood more clearly what I meant when I said Modern Advertising was more a matter of perspiration than inspiration.

It may seem that a great deal of effort has been expended in the accumulation of a great deal of information, which, in itself, is interesting, but which has no practical value. However, the next step will demonstrate the practical value of this accumulated information.

The first thing an analysis of the consumer and trade research for a product should reveal is the suitability of the product. The opinions of experts in the Trade and actual consumers, when scientifically analysed, provide evidence of the suitability or otherwise of the product—evidence that has been gathered in a scientific way, and which cannot be refuted. It may happen that the research has shown the product to be not suitable for the purpose for which it is designed. The value of the research at this stage is that, if the product actually is unsuitable, there is scientifically obtained evidence that this is so—evidence that should be pretty conclusive to the manufacturer, in spite of what he himself may think to the contrary. Without this preliminary research, quite a lot of money could be spent on advertising an unsuitable product, before small sales revealed definitely that it was unsuitable. As the result of research, Agencies have occasionally had to recommend to the client that the product should not be put on the market. Reputable Agencies will not accept the advertising of a product which market research has revealed to be unsuitable. In some instances, manufacturers have ignored these recommendations, and have gone to some less scrupulous Agency to get them to carry through the campaign. Without exception, in these circumstances, the sales result has proved the validity of the original market research.

Given the product is suitable, and that research shows that it is going to be a success, a further study of the research analysis enables basic market data to be organized. Retail shopping areas can be mapped out, and population distribution be counted.

Advancing a step further, marketing and sales quotas can be determined on the basis of the research. The result of investigating the Trade and the consumer will show what prices the public are willing to pay for the products. The trade research will show what profit the dealer wants to make on the line, and what selling schemes he would consider most helpful. All this information is compiled from, perhaps, hundreds, or even thousands, of dealers and consumers, and averages are taken. These averages will represent a truer picture of the situation than any figures taken from one or two dealers.

All this seems to be concerned with Marketing more than with Advertising. It serves, however, to illustrate the service with which the modern Agency provides the Advertiser. Marketing is closely bound up with Advertising, and, to ensure maximum effectiveness, these two must be developed as the single merchandising plan.

So far, nothing has been said as to how the actual advertising plan is developed from the research. A study of the habits of the consumer, as revealed by an analysis of the research, forms the basis of the copy appeal. Copy appeal, to be effective, must be directed towards those who are going to use the product, and must apply the product to the specific needs of those who are going to use it.

Analysis of the research will show, in an indisputably scientific way, who is going to use the product, men or women, children or adults, rich, poor, or middle-class people. In the pre-scientific stage, the advertising man may have had a notion to whom his copy was to be directed. This may, or may not, have been correct. The modern scientific method indisputably establishes to whom the appeal can be most effectively directed. It replaces guesswork with exact knowledge. The results are often surprisingly different from what the advertising man expected.

Going further, analysis of the research will show how the consumer uses certain products; for instance, some time ago, Horlick's Malted Milk was featured in England as an "eleven o'clock drink". When a less conservative and more modern Agency took over the account, research revealed that very few people drank Horlick's Malted Milk at eleven o'clock in the morning, and, indeed, only a few people ever drank anything of that nature at eleven o'clock. On the other hand, it was revealed that people did like a hot drink just before

going to bed at night because it made them sleep. The "eleven o'clock" appeal for Horlick's was discarded, and an appeal developed which featured Horlick's as a drink to be taken just before going to bed, to promote sleep. Sales, which had been at a standstill, started to go ahead with the new copy appeal. The moral of this is that, if the previous "eleven o'clock" appeal had been scientifically tested a long while before this, many thousands of pounds' worth of useless advertising would have been saved. The "eleven o'clock" appeal was one of those inspirations—just a hunch. Probably, the person whose inspiration it was drank Horlick's Malted Milk hot himself at eleven o'clock and immediately concluded everyone else would. Like a lot of hunches, it was sheer waste of money. Research actually provides the material for the copy. Copy-writing becomes, in a degree, mechanical. Research may reveal that 90 per cent. of the consumers interviewed use the product. What could be a better headline to persuade people to buy the product than "Ninety per cent. of people interviewed use Z's product to clean their teeth". Phrases and expressions by consumers during the research are embodied in the copy.

The big copy idea is just dug out by a lot of hard work. A copy idea dug out by hard work, besides being scientifically sound, is also always available. Inspiration, besides not being always reliable, is elusive, and not always there when it is wanted. Possibly research may suggest several different copy appeals. These would normally be tested against each other. The method of testing varies. Sometimes each appeal is run for a short time over similar ground. On other occasions, it is tested out by means of keyed advertisements, containing return coupons, that is, each advertisement contains a coupon, offering a free sample of the product to those who cut out and return the coupon. The appeal is judged by the number of coupons returned through each advertisement. Occasionally, test campaigns are run in selected territory before a national campaign is begun. This has become particularly the practice in England.

Assuming the copy appeal, based on research, has been determined, the next problem is where the advertisements containing this appeal are to be inserted. Here again, the old type of advertising man had a "hunch", which may, or may not, have been right. The modern advertising man has facts and figures before him relating to circulation, coverages of newspapers, who reads newspapers, and so on. With the aid of these facts and figures he selects certain newspapers, magazines, posters, movie slides, and forms of radio advertising.

A modern advertiser buys newspaper space just as he would buy a motor-car. He wants to know all about it. He

is the person paying for it, so he is entitled to know all about his white space. He wants to know the circulation of the paper; where the paper goes to—whether it goes to Sydney only, or all over Australia; who reads it—whether young people or adults, men or women, wealthy people or poor people. Nor is this all. The modern advertiser wants to know how the paper is sold—whether it is delivered to the home or is bought at a news-stand, whether the husband reads it in the tram and brings it home with him, or whether he just reads it in the tram and throws it in the waste-paper basket at his office. He wants to know why people read the paper—whether they read it for the news, or the women's interests contained in it, and so on. There is also a whole mass of more or less technical information relating to the size of the page the newspaper uses, the size of the columns, and so on, that the advertiser must have. This may seem an enormous amount of unnecessary data. However, it is actually most essential in selecting for advertising newspapers which will be read by the people who are going to use the product advertised. It would be no use advertising a high-class motor-car in newspapers read only by those who earn low wages; it would be no use advertising men's trousers in a Woman's Home Journal; it would be useless advertising refrigerators in a newspaper which was mostly sold in districts with a cold climate, nor should radiators be advertised in papers circulating in tropical countries. These may seem extreme cases, but I quote them merely to show how essential it is that the advertiser should know all about the newspaper, who reads it, and so on.

Advertising space in newspapers is usually paid for in proportion to circulation. A paper with the largest circulation should, logically, charge the higher price for its space. It is customary, for purposes of comparing the value of space bought in one newspaper with the value of space bought in another, to equate the price down to the cost for one single column-inch of advertising space to a 10,000 circulation. For instance, if the cost of an inch in a paper with a circulation of 100,000 is 8s. 4d., then the cost of a single column-inch per 10,000 circulation is 10d. Another newspaper, with a circulation of 50,000, may charge 6s. 3d. for a single column-inch. This works out at 1s. 3d. per 10,000 circulation, so that obviously the former of these two newspapers is preferable, other things being equal. Clearly, the advertiser must have a great deal of exact knowledge about newspaper circulation, so that he can estimate the relative value of each. The modern advertising man has no alternative but to go right out among newspaper readers, just as he went out among the consumers of the product. A definite *questionnaire* is formulated and newspaper readers are asked what papers they read, where they buy them, what

papers the various members of their family read, and so on. The answers of a representative cross-section of the community are analysed and form the basis of scientific data upon which the advertiser can feel confident in using certain papers to carry the advertising of a product. This provides that impersonal method of determining the papers which must be used to carry the advertising of a certain product to a certain class or type of person. It also provides information as to where the various papers are read, what proportion of the metropolitan papers are read in various country towns, and so on.

Here is an illustration of the value of a media survey of this nature. Some time ago, a large Australian advertiser, wishing to cover the whole of New South Wales, was uncertain whether he should advertise in both the Sydney papers and the local papers of certain country towns. He had a vague feeling at the back of his mind that if he omitted to advertise in the local country-town papers, the news about his product might not be read at all. The only way to find out definitely what to do was to send investigators to the country towns in question, and ask the type of person who would be most likely to use the product what papers they read. It transpired that the type of person most likely to use that particular product read both the Sydney and the local papers, so that, actually, there was no necessity to advertise in both. The advertiser's problem was solved. He found out that a number of people in country towns would not be missing his advertisements if he failed to advertise in the local country papers, and concentrated on the metropolitan papers only. Those most likely to buy his products would read all about them in the Sydney papers. The result of this was quite a considerable saving of money.

The scientific survey of people's newspaper habits also provides a fund of information on what is known as "the duplication of newspapers". For instance, if a large proportion of people use two papers, it represents a certain amount of waste if the advertisement appears in both. A media survey, when analysed, will reveal this overlapping between the readers of various papers. In the course of its experience, an Advertising Agency accumulates a vast amount of scientific data about newspaper readers' habits. This, of necessity, has to be revised from time to time, as, for example, when the price for Sydney's papers went up to 1½d. This has probably resulted in a change in people's habits. At present, these habits are still in a state of transition. In the course of the next few months, when things have settled down a bit more, it will be necessary to conduct another survey on the information then to hand.

Before concluding, some brief comments might be made upon the present financial depression and its relation to advertising.

In 1921, business men in the United States of America were faced with a problem similar, in many ways, to that which faces Australian business men today. It is interesting to compare conditions, as they then were in the United States, with conditions as they now exist in Australia. The cause of the conditions arising in America was a Stock Exchange crisis; Australia's condition is due to entirely different causes.

In the American depression of 1921 there was a definite shrinkage in the consumer's purchasing power, due partly to losses on the stock market and partly to the loss of a spendable surplus which had been built up through income from speculation. In America, the cessation of a forward move in stocks and real estate markets did not involve a serious blow to people's income because it represented only a surplus; people still had their wages, salaries or business income sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living. However, at the same time, this shrinkage did represent a cumulative and continuing shrinkage in the consumer's purchasing power. The individual manufacturer was therefore faced with the position of having fewer dollars to compete for. The consumer was still able to buy, as his income had not shrunk to the point where he was cut down to the bare necessities of living. The loss of the additional income once received from dabbling in stocks and shares still left the consumer with sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living.

Up to 1920, the American index figures of the cost of living and the average wage-earner's income followed each other closely, so that, until then, the natural tendency was to increase the standard of living up to the point of income, or often beyond it. Instalment selling tended to educate people to luxuries to which previously they had no access. It is comparatively easy to increase the standard of living, but human nature always rebels at a decrease. One-time luxuries had become necessities, so that, although the American consumer could not buy all the luxuries he wanted, he still wanted to buy as many as he could. This provided an opportunity for the American manufacturer of branded products, for the reason that consumers began to exercise their discretion as to what they should buy.

Numerous manufacturers, endeavouring to cut costs, began with their advertising, because it appeared a luxury to them, and, in any case, was the easiest cost to eliminate. They did not realize the danger of such a procedure.

An example of two similar firms, who followed two different courses during the 1921 crisis, is shown in the mail order houses

of Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. These two houses were doing a similar business to each other, and so comparison is all the more striking. Prior to 1920, Montgomery Ward had been doing a negligible amount of national advertising, but in 1921—the year of depression—they increased their appropriation to £14,000, and continued to increase it until 1924 when they reached £40,000 per annum. On the other hand, Sears Roebuck had been spending £20,000 in national advertising prior to 1921, but, in 1921, they spent a negligible amount, and, in 1922, they spent only about £1,400. The result of these two directly opposed policies is informative. In 1925, Sears Roebuck had just come back to the point where their sales were in 1920, before the depression, while, in the same year Montgomery Ward were 74 per cent. ahead of their “peak” sales before the depression.

Recently, an interesting study has been made in the *Saturday Evening Post* covering the same period of depression. An examination was made of the figures of 184 national advertisers, who spent £30,000 or more in leading American magazines during 1920 or 1921. Of these 184 advertisers, 59—or 32·1 per cent.—increased their expenditure in 1921, as compared with 1920, while the remaining 125 decreased it. Of the 59 increasing their advertising expenditure, profit and loss figures, covering the period 1919–1924, are available for 30. Of the 125 decreasing their appropriation, the figures of 46 are available for the same period.

An analysis and a comparison of the trend of net profits for each of these firms show that, taking the figures for 1919 as a basis, those who increased their appropriation during the depression, actually did show a drop in this period, but this drop was not nearly so great as that experienced by those who cut down their appropriation. In 1922, both groups recovered, but the group which eliminated their appropriation did *not* recover so rapidly as the other. (In point of fact, the latter group achieved figures beyond 1919, while the former did not.) It was not until 1923 that those who cut advertising got back to 1919 figures, while the other group continued to progress, and, in 1924, was still ahead 60 points. It is possible that, in some of these instances, the advertising itself was responsible for the result. The greatest possibility, however, is that shrewd management, during the depression, saw, in their competitor's elimination of advertising, an opportunity to acquire goodwill, so that, when the depression passed, the competitor had lost ground in this respect—ground which it took him at least four years to recover, and some of which will probably never be recovered.

The logical thing, therefore, seems to be that a manufacturer should, first of all, make sure that his marketing and advertising policy is correct. Then he should go ahead and maintain that policy, even though circumstances may seem against it.

The main aim we should have at the present moment is to make sure of our ground, cut out unnecessary expenses, consolidate our business, and just sit tight and wait for the good times which must be coming ahead of us. The man who wavers is going to lose, while the man who stands firm and steadfast, with a rooted conviction that his policy and his product are right, is going to show a profit after these years of depression have passed. A man who weakens is going to lose ground now, and, when the depression has passed, he is going to find he has lost so much ground that he can never recover it.

SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE.

By E. RONALD WALKER, M.A.,
Lecturer in Economics, Sydney University.

IN a recent article in this Journal on "The Psychological Practice of Vocational Guidance",¹ Dr. A. H. Martin concluded that the psychologist is "not rarely . . . rewarded by the knowledge that through his advice he has helped a fellow-being to know himself and has assisted him in his task of self-development, and thus in some measure he has rendered a distinct and unique 'social service'". It is the purpose of this article to assess the "distinct and unique social service" of vocational guidance, from the viewpoint of the economist.

Social service may be conceived in different ways. A service done to individuals can be regarded as social service if the number of individuals served forms a considerable proportion of the community. From this point of view, the important question arises, "Does the psychological practice of vocational guidance render a service to individuals?" Dr. Martin's article offered a definite, affirmative answer to this question, and in this he would have the backing of most students of the literature of the subject and most of those who have had personal experience of efficient guidance. Evidence that carries special weight with the economist is the fact, disclosed by the Annual Reports of the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology, that an increasing number of people in this country are prepared to pay for this service a fee which, though not a measure of the time and training of the officers of the Institute, may seem not inconsiderable to many parents. The economist would infer that the increasing "effective demand" for vocational guidance "at ruling prices" is an evidence that it is meeting the needs of individuals.

But in considering whether the psychological practice of vocational guidance is rendering a social service, the economist is led to consider it in a broader aspect. What contribution does it offer to the prosperity of the whole community? It has become almost conventional for economists to consider prosperity as a many-sided problem, so that economic progress is measured not merely by national income or production per head, but also by diminution of inequality, and improvement of the working conditions of the producer.² What bearing has the psychological practice of vocational guidance upon these three aspects of economic development?

¹ Vol. III, No. 2.

² Cf. T. E. Gregory: "Is America Prosperous", *Economica*, 1930.

PRODUCTION.

The earlier economists would not have regarded vocational guidance as an important factor in production. Indeed, the "father of political economy", Adam Smith, would have challenged the whole basis of differential psychology. His was an age when the equality of man was preached more literally than it is today. "The difference between the most dissimilar characters", he wrote,¹ "between a philosopher and a street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance." His adoption of this psychological doctrine led Smith to regard the advantages of division of labour somewhat differently from modern economists. While he would agree with them in stressing the importance of co-operation or the division of labour as a factor affecting production, his list of its advantages included only the acquisition of skill by the specialist, the greater likelihood of inventions, and the saving of time that jack-of-all-trades spends in passing from one kind of work to another. Modern economists have questioned whether the second of these advantages is considerable, because invention is by no means the monopoly of the workers engaged in the process to which the new device is to apply. Advances in knowledge are often made by people who are not directly connected with the trade in question. But the criticism of Adam Smith's successors has not been entirely destructive, for they have added three more to the list of advantages in production of the division of labour. J. S. Mill explained that the division of labour made possible economy of tools, since jack-of-all-trades must have a set of tools for each trade. Another obvious advantage is that division of labour makes possible localization of industries and economy in the use of the qualities of different parts of the earth's surface. This was implicitly recognized by Smith, and underlies the dictum, "International trade is but an incident in the division of labour". But equally important with any of these advantages is "that which is got by sorting persons out among different kinds of labour according to their natural qualities".² Modern economists recognize this, whereas Smith not only omitted it, but refused to consider that such differences


¹ "Wealth of Nations", ed. Cannan, p. 17.

² Cannan: "Review of Economic Theory", p. 96.

in natural qualities existed. Of course, it was not long before his view was challenged. In the "Economy of Machinery and Manufacture" (1832), Babbage drew attention to the fact that "factory work could be advantageously divided between persons of different natural strength as well as of different acquired skill".¹ The recognition of differences in natural capacity to acquire skill was to come later, and today few remain who dispute it.

It is clear, then, that the psychological practice of vocational guidance performs a real social service in so far as it assists the process of "sorting persons out among different kinds of labour according to their natural qualities". This service is distinct from and additional to that rendered to the individuals concerned, since it adds directly to the productivity of the community's labour. But the utility of psychology in this connection is limited by the existing economic organization. It is all very well to tell people the vocations to which they are suited, but the psychologist cannot say whether they will find employment there. There is a difference between keeping square pegs out of round holes and putting them into square holes. Are there equal numbers of square pegs and square holes?

This problem may be phrased a little more exactly, for the interest of those who following the advice of Graham Wallas² have learned to think in terms of frequency curves. For many biological and psychological traits, the frequency distribution follows a normal curve. Let us assume that a certain group of traits, such as that known as "general intelligence", is distributed according to the frequency curve A. Now, it is conceivable that the frequency of occupational openings demanding the various degrees of "intelligence" is distributed in a similar manner. But general observation suggests that



¹ *Op cit.*, p. 132 ff.

² "The Great Society", Ch. X.

the occupational distribution is definitely asymmetrical, something like curve B. In this case the vocational counsellor is faced by a problem to which psychology holds no key. The same is true if the total number of cases included in A exceeds those in B, but this problem is more obvious.

In the case suggested by our diagram, the psychologist can render a definite service by preventing any of those individuals who are placed below the median in A from seeking positions above the median of B. But the fact must be faced that many who are placed above the median in A must seek employment below the median in B. The problem of vocational guidance becomes very complex. If he is to render the greatest service to production, the vocational psychologist must assist the distribution of persons in occupations where, in the light of existing economic organization, their natural qualities can be used to the best advantage. Judged broadly, the psychological practice of vocational guidance falls short, according to our assumptions, unless the economic conditions are taken into account. To perform its fullest social service vocational guidance must include, not only diagnosis of vocational aptitudes, but prognosis of vocational success, and this involves a knowledge of the possibilities of placement and employment.

This introduces an economic problem. What is the absorptive capacity of the various occupations that form our economic life? To this question our ignorance prevents an answer. For effective guidance the following information is required:

- (1) How many recruits can each occupation absorb into employment at the present time?
- (2) How permanent is their employment likely to be?

The first question could be answered by a statistical survey, but as yet no satisfactory attempt has been made in this direction. The Commonwealth Statistician publishes figures of the number of hands employed in factories, classified by industries and States, but the classification is too broad to throw light upon the problem under consideration. Yet, in the absence of such information, vocational guidance may be but blind guidance.

The second question is much more intricate, for it involves not only enumeration of present openings, but a forecast of future developments. This is a problem that the economist has yet to solve. Sceptics say: "It never will be solved", and such a view is understandable. But some sort of forecast is assumed in all vocational guidance, and the recognition that this problem exists and is important, would mark a step forward. Imperfect forecasts are better than nothing. In fact the task of making them less imperfect is not as hopeless as may

appear to the layman. Attempts to devise a scientific technique of economic forecasting are of comparatively recent origin, and considerable progress has been made since the war. The psychologist is hardly likely to let his work await the completion of the economist's technique, but the real benefits of vocational guidance will not be obtained until such forecasts of absorptive capacity are available.

Our conclusion, therefore, regarding the contribution of vocational guidance to the problem of production, is that its psychological practice should enable the community to exercise much better economy in its use of productive power, but that to achieve any considerable benefits from vocational guidance we must supplement its psychological practice with economic prognosis.

INEQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.

What contribution does the psychological practice of vocational guidance offer to the economic problem of inequality? Will the placing of individuals into occupations to which they are suited lead to changes in the distribution of income such as might increase or decrease inequality? The causes of inequality of earnings are numerous. Do they include ignorance of one's potentialities? The generally accepted view is that large earnings are to be had in those occupations where the available knowledge, ability and training are scarce relatively to the demand for them. Low wages are associated with occupations requiring but ordinary ability, little training and knowledge, and the workers who can fill such positions are very plentiful relatively to the demand for their services.

If vocational guidance leads a considerable number of people, who would otherwise have chosen poorly paid occupations, to aim higher, and to seek positions towards which they are guided because of their superior native ability, the average rate of pay in these positions will fall, since the scarcity of the desired qualities will have been relieved. But this is not likely, for the obvious reason that ignorance as to one's own ability is seldom the major factor that keeps the poor among the poor. The children of parents who hold highly paid positions naturally aspire to similar occupations, but the children of the poorly paid must not aspire to well-paid work, even if a psychologist recommends them to do so. Lack of opportunity is the dominating factor. There are exceptional cases, where a boy of poor parents wins success and fame in an honourable profession, but such cases usually depend upon the sacrifices made by his parents, or upon benevolence that makes possible the economic support of the youth during his years of training. The scarcity of workers to fill the higher positions is due to:

- (1) The real scarcity of superior ability.

- (2) The artificial scarcity, due to lack of self-knowledge.
- (3) The artificial scarcity of trained ability, due to the high cost of training relatively to the incomes of ordinary people.

Of these, the second, to which psychological guidance is most obviously relevant, is *comparatively* unimportant, though none the less worth attacking. To the third problem, psychology has no direct contribution to make. Nor can vocational guidance, as such, effect any reduction in the real scarcity of superior ability. But differential psychology, which is the basis of psychological guidance, can render an important service by giving us more exact knowledge concerning the distribution of rare ability throughout the population. The conclusion emerges, however, that the psychological practice of vocational guidance contributes little to the solution of the problem of inequality.

But guidance in a broader sense may make a real contribution to the problem of distribution. It is accepted that it would be economically advantageous for differences in incomes to measure the dissatisfactions involved in various occupations. Irregular, dangerous and monotonous work would receive higher remuneration in any truly equalitarian society. Theoretically, some additional inducement should be required to lead people to do such work. But in our economic society, the worst paid work is often the most laborious, and that in which the risk of unemployment is greatest. This is due chiefly to lack of opportunity, and partly to lack of ability to enter the occupations where both conditions and pay are better. But another contributing cause is the ignorance of individuals regarding the conditions that they will meet in different occupations. Over a fairly long period, unless it be one of great economic disturbances, the risk of unemployment to the individual is measurable. Studies in different parts of the world have shown that this risk varies from occupation to occupation. The following table illustrates the differences in Australian industries in this regard.

Again, the classification of occupations is too crude to be of much assistance in vocational guidance. But the principle is clear enough. The vocational counsellor should be able to tell a youngster whether the occupation recommended is one (such as printing) where employment is steady, or one (such as engineering) where unemployment is comparatively frequent. This type of information is as yet nowhere available. If it were used as a basis for vocational guidance there would probably be fewer applicants in the more unstable occupations, and rates

TABLE.

Industry.	Average Percentage of Trade Union Members Unemployed, Australia, 1913-28.
1. Wood, furniture, etc.	6.3
2. Engineering, metals, etc.	8.5
3. Food, drink, tobacco	10.5
4. Clothing, hats, etc.	5.4
5. Books, printing, etc.	2.8
6. Other manufacturing	9.7
7. Building	6.7
8. Mining, quarrying, etc.	9.8
9. Land transport other than railways and tramways	4.4
All Groups	7.8

of pay therein would tend to rise. In this way the differences of pay would more nearly indicate the differences in conditions.

A similar study of the risks of sickness and accident is needed. These, too, vary from occupation to occupation, and should be reflected in wage rates to a greater extent than is the case at present.

In this vocational guidance, based upon knowledge of economic conditions, offers a real contribution to the problem of ideal distribution. But its rôle must not be exaggerated, for it has no bearing upon the two fundamental problems of inequality of ability and inequality of opportunity.

WORKING CONDITIONS.

The third aspect of prosperity is working conditions. This is a complicated matter, and includes not only objective conditions, such as lighting, temperature, hours of work and the like, but more subjective conditions, such as the attractiveness of the work itself, fatigue, monotony, and personal contacts. It is clear that there is an appropriate place for vocational guidance here. Both fatigue and dislike for work should be alleviated if individuals can find work for which they are physically and psychologically suitable. But this is an advantage that is likely to disappear, so far as a great section of industry is concerned, because the progressive mechanization of the worker leaves little margin within which to stimulate his rapidly atrophying "joy in work".

CONCLUSION.

From this brief discussion emerge several ways in which the psychological practice of vocational guidance can render a distinct and unique social service in our economic life, but in every case the situation is complicated by factors of a purely economic nature. For vocational guidance to render its

greatest service it must be based, not only upon expert psychological analysis and measurement, but also upon a knowledge of the relevant economic doctrines. And a still greater social service could be rendered by such guidance if it functioned in a community where inequality of opportunity were less a barrier to true economy of human ability and character.

RESEARCHES AND REPORTS.

THE SEASHORE SERIAL DISCRIMETER AND ITS APPLICATION TO TYPEWRITING ABILITY, ETC.

By WILLIAM BELL, B.Ec.,¹
Psychological Laboratory, University of Sydney.

WE find two main types of motor tests for serial action, which are distinguishable from each other, namely:

- (a) Pursuit tests, employing continuous adjustive reactions to some sort of target; and
- (b) discrimination or tachistoscopic tests, in which there is a chain of unit reactions to a limited number of types of stimuli.

The present machine is of the latter variety, and was first suggested by Seashore.² It consists, so far as the subject is concerned, of a large screen pierced by a variable slit through which one or more letters may be seen. The letters used were A, B, C and D. At the base of the screen are four keys labelled A, B, C and D respectively. Pressure of the key corresponding to the correct letter appearing in the slit results in a new letter appearing, which indicates that another key corresponding to the new letter must be pressed, and so on. Pressure of the wrong key fails to change the letter in the slit and merely results in a loss of time and effort. The letters are mounted on a disc behind the screen and are visible through the slit. This disc rotates whenever released, which is effected by a pressure on the correct key. The slit may be so extended as to expose any number of letters at the one time, but only one must be pressed, namely, that appearing at the right-hand side of the slot. When more than one are exposed, the others are merely shown for the purpose of preparing the subject for what is coming.

In all, there are one hundred possible reactions per single revolution of the disc. The score is taken as the number of seconds occupied by the subject to complete the hundred reactions.

The investigation was divided into two parts. In the first place the objective aimed at was to test the capacity of the machine for measuring the following factors:

- (1) Quickness of perception and reaction.
- (2) Practice effects.
- (3) Fatigue:
 - (a) Muscular.
 - (b) Mental.
- (4) Attention, by the introduction of various distractions.

¹The writer particularly desires to tender his thanks to Dr. A. H. Martin who suggested and supervised the work.

²Seashore, R. H.: "Technique of Measuring Serial Reaction", *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. XI, No. 1, p. 45.

The test comprised a series of trials given to the subject under varying conditions. Twenty University students were used as subjects. Distractions were of two kinds:

- (a) Sound distraction, a gramophone record tracing an eccentric course on the turntable, emitting an extremely unpleasant effect.
- (b) Mental, in which the subject is required to add "17's" progressing to a given number, at the same time operating the apparatus.

The second portion of the work constituted an attempt to establish the machine as a means of measuring potential typewriting ability. It was also proposed to link up this manual test with the Institute's Clerical Test devised by R. Piddington.¹ In this part of the work the subjects were chosen from a city business college. In all, there were twenty-two beginners and twenty-four seniors—the latter having had over six months' college training.

TABLE I.

Test.	Average Time in Seconds.		
	Males.	Females.	Final Average.
A. One letter using right hand	87.2	82.1	84.0
B. One letter using right hand	85.0	78.1	80.4
C. Three letters using right hand	86.5	82.1	84.1
D. Three letters using left hand	90.2	78.2	82.2
E. Three letters using both hands (two fingers of each)	76.8	71.7	73.6
F. One letter using right hand	74.2	70.1	71.4
G. One letter using right hand, with noise distraction	77.5	69.3	72.4
H. One letter using right hand, with 17's distraction ..	201.0	206.0	205.2
J. One letter using right hand, as A, B and F	70.8	68.5	69.3

Practice Effects.—Every ten reactions were timed in the first few seconds, but results showed a negligible diminution in times. Table I shows, however, that the even total times for Trials A, B, F and J, in which conditions were the same, diminished gradually to five-sixths of the original time. There was no definite evidence of the effects of fatigue, however.

Attention.—In this regard the results were more satisfactory. Table I shows that the sound distraction only slightly lengthened the average time. This average is rather misleading, since in some cases the time was appreciably longer, and in other cases it served rather as a stimulus to concentrate attention and resulted in quicker work.

The mental distraction of adding 17's proved particularly arduous, and increased the average time to about three times that of the average normal round. This shows that the apparatus is particularly suitable for demonstrating the effect on attention either by introducing an extraneous distraction or by means of the "double task" method.

Three Letters at a Time.—These trials are interesting. At first the introduction of two extra letters into the margin of attention resulted in confusion and lengthened times. Trial E (Table I), however, shows that later the extra letters served to facilitate the work by preparing the subject.

Sex Differences.—The table shows that female scores were appreciably superior. The results appear to follow the principle that there is a tendency to quicker perceptual motor reaction by females than males.

¹"Psychological Tests for Clerical Workers", THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 59-69.

TABLE II.
Norms for Business College Students.

Test.	Average Times in Seconds.	
	Beginners' Averages.	Seniors' Averages.
A. One letter right hand	95.2	92.8
B. Three letters right hand	97.6	95.6
C. Three letters both hands	90.6	89.2
D. Mean of B and C	91.6	90.2

Table II shows the scores for Beginners and Seniors. It will be noted that these scores are inferior to those of the University students. There may be an age factor to account for this—the average age of the girls being approximately sixteen years, but such is hardly likely to be the case.

The correlation coefficients showing positive value for machine and clerical tests were:

Substitution and Machine	0.32
Concentration and Machine	0.45

The first pair are of interest in that they both involve learning by repetition, which apparently is the factor underlying the coefficient. The latter pair is easily explicable, since they are both serial reaction tests involving certain similar factors.

Practical Results.—The most interesting and valuable result of the whole investigation is the correlation coefficient of the Discrimeter Machine with actual typing results, which is 0.52. This comparatively high coefficient would appear to prove that the machine does measure some features of potential typing ability.

The value of the clerical test as a measure of general ability for this type of work has already been demonstrated. We may also conclude that the Discrimeter Machine can well be used in conjunction with the former to measure the practical and motor side of the individual's aptitudes for general typing and office work. It would therefore prove itself of service in psychological tests used in vocational guidance.

REVIEWS.

THE BOOK OF DIOGENES LAERTIUS: ITS SPIRIT AND ITS METHOD.

By Richard Hope. New York: Columbia University Press. 1930.
Pp. xiv, 241. 3 dollars.

"The authority with which the book of Diogenes Laertius has come to be invested and the high regard in which it has come to be held—despite the precariousness of its history: the comparative lack of early references to it, the confused state of its manuscript tradition, and the uncertain condition of its text—warrant and compel an examination of the thought-structure underlying its composition." In these words Mr. Hope indicates the topic and the method which, as the Preface informs us, were presented to him to work upon. This introduction of "directed research" into the field of Greek philosophy will scarcely perturb the classical scholar, but it will be a stumbling-block to the Greekless student if, as may well happen in certain quarters, he has the book foisted on him as an "authoritative" work.

Mr. Hope exhibits all the industry of the "researcher" in collecting, tabulating and enumerating, and all his inability to treat problems critically. This is well exemplified in the treatment, in the opening chapter, of the problems of the date of composition of the book of Diogenes, and of the manuscripts. The widely differing views as to the date are set forth, and "the indications of the period in which Diogenes lived and wrote are thus seen to be inconclusive". It is remarked that certain scholars, considering all the evidence, have provisionally fixed the date in the first half of the third century A.D. "The book may, however, in view of its use by Sopater, be dated as late as the fourth century, or, if this argument may be disregarded, even as late as the sixth century." Similarly, the section on manuscripts is summed up in the statement, "Thus in the question of the relation of the various manuscripts to each other no conclusion has been reached which has commended itself to all concerned." Helpless argument of this kind is scarcely sufficient to show that, as compared with other lines of approach to the book of Diogenes, Mr. Hope's method is "warranted and compelled".

This method, we have seen, is that of an *internal* examination of the book of Diogenes. "Before confidence can be placed in what he tells us about his philosophers, it is necessary to learn what he tells us about himself" (p. 35). Accordingly, the main part of Mr. Hope's book is devoted to considering "the use which Diogenes Laertius makes of his source materials" and "the points of view from which he regards philosophy and philosophers"; and on these questions Mr. Hope exhibits his full powers of enumeration and of seeing indications to be inconclusive. Thus, on the former point, he decides that "no conclusions may safely be drawn concerning particular writings which Diogenes Laertius may have read at first hand" (p. 210). For example, "the five explicit references to Aristophanes, or the nine to Euripides, or even the forty-four to Timon, including the ten expressly naming the *Silli*, do not furnish any proof that may be desired that Diogenes was directly acquainted with the work of these poets and did not quote them at second-hand" (p. 87).

It may be said at once that a person who desires to reach "safe" conclusions should never enter upon any historical, or indeed any scientific, inquiry, and is not competent to pass judgment on the findings of scholars who have entertained hypotheses and followed them up. Nothing could show better than Mr. Hope's procedure the uselessness of statistical and tabulatory matter without hypotheses in relation to which it is to be considered; indeed, it is only when we have a hypothesis that we know what "data" to collect. But there is a sort of hypothesis, or rather an intention, behind Mr. Hope's technique of inconclusiveness. He wishes to derive from the "unreliability" of Diogenes and the contention that the book has exercised "a determining influence on nearly all histories of Greek philosophy", the conclusion that "an authentic history of Greek philosophy cannot be written".

Now, apart from Mr. Hope's particular fallacies, this is a conclusion that his internal method cannot give. What if according to Diogenes, "Thales teaches that water is the primary element"? Aristotle tells us this also. And if Plato's philosophy "is still treated as a system of physical, dialectical, and ethical doctrines", is Diogenes to blame for this, seeing that we have the dialogues and the testimony of Aristotle? Whatever "nearly all" historians may have done, the real question is of the proper use of a *tradition* which, while it cannot pass for history, may provide valuable historical material; the only scholarly method is to consider "Diogenes" in relation to other sources and as a part of Greek literature.

Mr. Hope's conclusion (p. 208) is that "as a treatment of Greek philosophy, therefore, the book of Diogenes Laertius cannot be accepted as an objective account, but must be judged as having been determined by extraneous influences in the light of which alone it may be properly estimated. While kernels of historical truth no doubt found their way into the documents,

it is next to impossible to separate the wheat from the chaff. The influence of Diogenes Laertius seems to make a critical examination of the product of his labors imperative, but the result of such an examination seems to imply that an authentic history of Greek philosophy cannot be written. As a source book of biographical and doxographical items concerning the classic philosophers of Greece, the compilation of Diogenes Laertius cannot, in view of his methods, be regarded with much seriousness." With such irresponsible pronouncements may be compared the remarks of Burnet in his *Note on the Sources* ("Early Greek Philosophy", 3rd edition, pp. 37, 8). "The scrap-book which goes by the name of Diogenes Laertios, or Laertios Diogenes (cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, pp. 1 *sqq.*) contains large fragments of two distinct doxographies. One is of the merely biographical, anecdotic, and apophthegmatic kind used by Hippolytos in his first four chapters; the other is of a better class, more like the source of Hippolytos' remaining chapters. An attempt is made to disguise this 'contamination' by referring to the first doxography as a 'summary' account, while the second is called 'particular'; and "The work which goes by the name of Laertios Diogenes is, in its biographical parts, a mere patchwork of all earlier learning. It has not been digested or composed by any single mind at all, but is little more than a collection of extracts made at haphazard. But of course it contains much that is of the greatest value." This is sufficient to indicate that what is of value in Mr. Hope's internal method has already been used by eminent scholars as a small part of a general scheme of investigation.

Mr. Hope refers to Burnet's work (though he gives the title wrongly in each case; it appears twice as "Early Greek Philosophers" and, in the bibliography, as "Early Greek Thinkers"), but he makes no remark on the above statements, which would cast doubt from the outset on his attempt to treat "Diogenes" as a single mind; he retains, without reference to its having been questioned, the view that "the author's favorite method of exposition was to state the doctrines first by way of summary and then in detail" (p. 175); and, most important of all, he says nothing about Burnet's full list of sources, which would show that the writing of the history of Greek philosophy does not depend on Diogenes. In point of fact, Mr. Hope's book is a veiled polemic against such conceptions as Burnet's of the importance of Greek philosophy; but, instead of attacking the opposing case directly, he endeavours to establish his position by arguing that the book of Diogenes is neither a good history nor good philosophy (as Burnet, of course, admits), and frees himself from further responsibility by remarks of the "nearly all" type.

To show, however, that Diogenes is unreliable is not, as Mr. Hope seems to suppose, to give reason for doubting every statement he makes, or for discounting his corroboration of other people's statements; and it does nothing to shake the contention of Diogenes that the Greeks founded philosophy and that their philosophical work is of the first importance. Mr. Hope constantly uses such expressions as "the desperate attempts of Diogenes Laertius to trace the beginnings of philosophy, including cosmological speculations, to the Greeks" (p. 111), but he does not see the necessity of offering independent proof of the view that Diogenes is wrong. All that he does, in this connection, is to give the following quotation (pp. 111, 2) from Professor Woodbridge (to whom it is, as the Preface tells us, that he is indebted "for the topic of the essay, for the methods employed, and for many of the contentions made")—"It is the past not as it was, but as it was recovered in the imaginations of men, that makes history. So if you ask the cosmos the Greeks did not originate philosophy, but if you ask tradition they did. Their originality is defined by the fact that they were so long believed to be original. If we knew their predecessors that would help us to understand the Greeks and might alter their future reputation, but it cannot alter the fact that for twenty-five centuries they have been the originators for the Western world of that peculiar kind of curiosity

which we call philosophy. The course of events helped them wonderfully, but that was a characteristic of the course of events, the bare fact of the Greek habit of mind enduring amid vicissitude. We may therefore claim, using the words of a favorite Greek distinction, that while philosophy did not begin with the Greeks in the order of nature, it does begin with them in the order of ideas. First they were not, but first they are. They achieved a distinction which nature denied them." (Woodbridge, "Philosophy", in *Greek Literature*; Columbia University Press.) To this piece of sapience, which gives some idea of the atmosphere in which his work was conceived and executed, Mr. Hope adds: "For Diogenes Laertius, however, it lay in the course of nature that philosophy began with the Greeks."

This, then, besides pointing the moral of the book, is used as another count in the indictment of Diogenes. No attempt is made to consider the question of where and when philosophy began, by taking account, as Burnet does, of what philosophy is. Mr. Hope's own conception of philosophy is indicated in his criticisms of the outlook of Diogenes on philosophical work. "Biography and doxography were allied in the mind of Diogenes not in this way that the opinions of the philosophers reflected their experiences, but rather that the teachings they received and communicated were usually productive of the kind of life they lived. The formal doctrines enunciated by the philosophers are, however, treated separately and out of every vital relationship with the course of their life" (p. 169), except in one passage on Plato. "Diogenes did not endeavor to interpret the lives and opinions of his philosophers in the light of the motives controlling these philosophers. . . . His interpretations of the lives and opinions of the eminent philosophers were made in the light of his own interests; he sought for the expression of ideas on topics that were fundamental in his own scheme" (pp. 207, 8). These topics, it appears, were Physics, Ethics and Dialectic, which, of course, are nothing at all in comparison with what Mr. Hope calls "ways of looking at the universe and at life". In addition, "so far as" Diogenes was influenced by his more immediate predecessors (how far that is we are not shown), we are to conclude (pp. 211-3) that "Philosophy, as represented by the writers of the centuries before Diogenes Laertius who influenced his work, was retrospective instead of being original and forward-looking. . . . In the hands of such as had studied the old masters, philosophy became a means of educating the masses instead of being an organised expression of experience. . . . The great thinkers were treated as teachers who transmitted their teachings to their loyal disciples; their opinions were viewed as systems of doctrines expressed in propositions. . . . Thus philosophy was treated as a controversial or sectarian affair, rather than as a technique of impartial and open-minded inquiry."

Mr. Hope's forward-looking and open-minded philosophy, then, appears to be on a level with his method of treating history. It would be interesting to know what "organised expression of experience" is to be discovered in, say, Babylonian or Egyptian work. But the main points to be made are that philosophy is doctrine and that doctrine is expressed in propositions; that the question of philosophy, what we mean by saying of anything that "it is", was raised specifically by the Greeks, and that, as no one has shown better than Burnet, philosophers have still much to learn from looking back to Plato and his predecessors—not least with the help of the history which that great scholar *has* written.

To sum up, Mr. Hope has taken unnecessary pains to show that the book of Diogenes is eulogistic, that it is not a good history of Greek philosophy, and that anyone who took it as a sole and authoritative source would go far astray. But on the question, which others have settled for themselves, of what is then the proper use of "Diogenes", he has not even begun to do the requisite thinking. And to his concluding remark that "while the Laertian compilation gives illuminating answers to many questions, in some respects the *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* has nevertheless,

even to the present day, remained a mystery", we may reply that his method and his prejudices have partly made the mystery and have prevented him from doing anything to dispel what remains.

It is unfortunate that so crude a piece of work should be published by a University Press. It is because the book has been given this "authority" that I have treated it at such length—also, of course, because it may keep students away from the most important work, for the advancement of philosophical speculation, that has been done in recent times. There is no need further to indicate the repetitions and the disjointedness of Mr. Hope's argument; the quotations given should enable readers to form an estimate of his general style, which is not improved by the use of such phrases as "back of" (behind), "visits with", "aimed to make", "measured up to every test", and "scored" (apparently meaning *censured*). Besides the wrong naming of Burnet's book, I have noted "Cyrenaics" for "Cynics" (p. 86), and "Euthedemus" (pp. 75 and 95; correct on p. 84).

JOHN ANDERSON.

NOTIONS SUR LE LANGAGE. (After the researches of Father Marcel Jousse.) By L'Abbé Robert Jacquin. Paris: J. Vrin. 1929. Pp. 43.

This brochure gives an account of the theory of Father Jousse that language is primarily gesture. This, of course, is profoundly true, and the brochure, which consists of an exposition mainly in the form of quotations, has many interesting things to say in this regard. The exposition divides into three parts dealing respectively with "*le style manuel*", or expression through the hand; "*le style oral*" which derives from "*le style manuel*"; and "*le style écrit*", which divides again into that "improperly so called" and that "properly so called": in the one we have just simply what "*le style oral*" dictates, in the other written language follows its own laws and provides the triumph of "graphism". Though one likes to think of language as implying mental processes as well as instruments of expression, yet the exposition in this brochure and the matter expounded compensate for the fact that other aspects of language do not find a place.

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE. By Fowler D. Brooks, Associate-Professor of Education, Johns Hopkins University. Pp. xxiii, 652. London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd. [1929.] (Riverside Text-books in Education.) Price: 10s. 6d. net.

The author has produced a well-balanced common-sense presentation of the various physical, mental, social and moral processes which occur during adolescence. The period of adolescence opens at puberty (about the twelfth or thirteenth year of life) and ends at the coming of adulthood. The data for study have been obtained from actual investigations made by the author, as well as from the results of experimental work of others; and the whole of the records have been sifted and adopted for the use of students in psychology and education. Each chapter contains a generalized statement of the main conclusions of the data under appropriate psychological headings, and ends with problems for class discussion together with selected references to other works. From its make-up one may rightly call the work a manual; and a very good manual it is.

Towards the whole problem Professor Brooks's general view-point is that "development is a continuous function throughout childhood and into and through adolescence; that the youth normally does not break with his past; that in fact the roots of his present nature lie deeply embedded in his past". In other words, no "new traits" are observed at adolescence; there are no "breaks" or "gaps" suddenly filled up from nowhere. Development is continuous. There are changes of course, and modifications of previous tendencies; but their integration is not independent of what has come out of the past. The transition is not abrupt. This does not mean that marked individual variations, including pathological conditions and mental aberrations, are excluded. These do appear as everyone knows,

but they are likened to the extremes of variability indicated in the distributions of any element or process which is measured. In other words, we must learn to view all manifestations of human processes at whatever period in terms of distributions of individual measures or values, and not merely in terms of abstractions or concepts which have been elicited from concrete settings.

The outstanding feature of Professor Brooks's work is the mass of objective evidence which he has produced and collected from various sources. Superficial and one-sided views have been discarded and a serious attempt at a scientific valuation of results is made in contrast to the unbalanced outpourings of morbid experiences.

This book may be recommended with confidence to teachers and students of educational psychology.

E. MORRIS MILLER.

ANNOUNCEMENT.

ARCHIVE FOR HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Publisher: Carl Heymann, Berlin W.8, Mauerstrasse 44.

"The Archive for the History of Philosophy"—"*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*"—founded in 1887 by Ludwig Stein and Hermann Diels, Wilhelm Dilthey, Benno Erdmann and Eduard Zeller (augmented in 1895 by a systematical part) will be continued by DR. ARTHUR STEIN, Berne (Humboldtstrasse 35), member of the University of Berne, son of the founder and director who died not long ago.

The new director wishes to concentrate the work anew on the *history* of Philosophy, but in an international framework.

Every contribution of value including foreign ones may be published in the first part of the books which is to be reserved for the *treatises*.

Regular and detailed *accounts*, which will appear yearly, will tell of the novelties in the history of Philosophy (books, articles of review, publications from the academies) not only from Germany, but also from foreign countries. Mr. G. Dawes Hicks, Cambridge, for instance, is in charge of the English accounts. Besides, such yearly reports from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the Scandinavian countries and Czecho-Slavonia are assured.

From 1931 there will be published 3 volumes of 110 pages each per annum. The extent and the size have been enlarged. The price of the annual subscription is 16 marks as before.

The following sign as co-directors: Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg), Adolf Dyroff (Bonn), Hermann Glockner (Heidelberg), G. Dawes Hicks (Cambridge), Ernst Hoffman (Heidelberg), Karl Joël (Bâle), Aléxandre Koyré (Paris), Wincenty Lutoslawski (Wilno), Efraim Liljequist (Lund), Robert Reininger (Vienna), Heinrich Rickert (Heidelberg), Carlo Sganzini (Berne), Eduard Spranger (Berlin), Dmitry Tschizewskij (Freiburg i/Br.).

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS: OXFORD, 1930.

I have been asked to send the Journal my impressions of the Oxford Congress. I shall not try to give a philosophical summary of the eighty papers that were delivered, or even to select the most important. Those interested can read them all in the published Proceedings. I think it is generally agreed that the interest of such a Congress is in the opportunities

it gives for personal relations rather than in the work of the meetings. Among the distinguished writers present, Professor Alexander was certainly the most impressive as a person. As he spoke, everything about him went to make the impression of informed insight. The massive head, the patriarchal beard, the broad forehead and deep-set eyes, the quiet resonance of the voice, all contributed to the picture of the wise man. And then his seriousness would be lighted by a most lively twinkle of his eyes, in full relish of the joke that his deafness prevented his hearing the chairman's warning that his time was up. It was apparent that Professor Alexander enjoyed the affectionate and deep respect of everyone at the Congress. Then there was Professor Stout. No student who has had the *Manual* or *Analytical* set as his textbook could fail to be interested in meeting their author. In physique, he is the opposite of Professor Alexander. If first year students in Australia knew how very kind and modest he is in person, they would surely lose some of their fear of his formidable works. He always seemed eager to encourage others rather than to speak himself; but when he did speak, one realized that he was formidable after all. Those who feel, perhaps unreasonably, that the quality of a man's character should match his intellectual distinction, could not be disappointed in meeting Professor Stout and Professor Alexander. Among the visitors from the Continent, perhaps Professor Croce attracted the greatest attention. His outstanding characteristic at a casual acquaintance is his overflowing mental vitality. Although he was careful to make no reference to contemporary national politics, it was particularly interesting to hear him discuss the development of freedom in modern history, and insist that history only has meaning in so far as it is a development of freedom. Professor Lutoslawski, of Wilno, gave the most startling paper. He claimed that modern events are the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies, and showed himself possessed of a passionate Messianic enthusiasm. Although few of his hearers can have felt themselves in agreement with Professor Lutoslawski's views, and although he preached them at every available opportunity, he was one of the most popular speakers, for he seemed to speak with equal fire, eloquence and wit in every language, and always sat down well before his time was up. It was noticeable that, in general, the foreign delegates spoke with a vigour and oratorical power that were absent in the grimmer and more deliberate addresses of the speakers in English. Many of them apparently felt that philosophy was exciting, and they were not afraid of showing their enthusiasm.

Regarded as serious philosophical discussions, the meetings were, in truth, a great disappointment. In the first place, the chairmen were under instructions to be firm in applying the twenty-minutes rule for the principal speakers, and in some cases it was obviously not long enough for the adequate development of a thesis. Professor Alexander, for example, was just becoming warmed up and the audience very eager for him to continue, when the chairman was compelled to stop him. Then the readers of the papers had no opportunity of knowing before the Congress what the other readers were going to say, so that there was seldom any continuity between papers. And when the "designated" readers had finished their papers the discussion ranged unchecked over all time and all existence. This laid heavy demands on the listeners' powers of synoptic vision. No doubt there are difficulties in arranging in advance that each meeting shall discuss a single subject in a connected way, and a feeling of courtesy makes it difficult to restrain irrelevant speeches by visitors. Yet it seems a great pity that when such pains are taken to arrange a meeting place for persons, a greater effort is not made to arrange a meeting point for ideas.

The weather and environment were perfect. The beauty of the colleges, and river and countryside, and four days of bright, unbroken sunshine played a big part in making the Congress an exceedingly pleasant, as well as a stimulating, experience.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOTHES.** By J. C. Flügel. London: The Hogarth Press. 1930. Price: 21s.
- SOZIOLOGIE ALS WIRKLICHKEITSWISSENSCHAFT.** By H. Freyer. Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner. Price: 12 marks.
- FORUM PHILOSOPHICUM.** Edited by Raymund Schmidt. New York and Leipzig: International Philosophical Society. Subscription: 30 marks.
- PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS.** To commemorate the 60th Birthday of Joseph Geyser. Two Volumes. Regensburg: Josef Habbel.
- UN AMATEUR DE LA JEUNESSE AU XIII^e SIÈCLE.** By Marguerite Aron. Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, Paris. 1930. Price: 20 francs.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

- MIND.** A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Edited by Professor G. E. Moore. Macmillan & Co. Yearly subscription: 16s. Vol. XL. No. 157. January, 1931. The Concrete Universal—Cook, Wilson and Bosanquet: M. B. Foster. Why do we prefer Probabilities relative to many Data?: J. Hosiasson. Faculties and Instincts: C. A. Mace. Physical Objects and Scientific Objects: C. E. M. Joad.
- THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY.** Edited by Professors Woodbridge, Bush and Schneider, Columbia University. Published fortnightly. Subscription: 4 dollars a year.
- Vol. XXVII. No. 22. October 23, 1930. Seventh International Congress of Philosophy: Brand Blanshard. No. 23. November 6. The Dialectical Argument against Absolute Simultaneity (I): Arthur O. Lovejoy. How "Propositions" Mean: F. C. S. Schiller. In Defence of an Impression: Sidney Hook. No. 24. November 20. The Dialectical Argument against Absolute Simultaneity (II): Arthur O. Lovejoy. The Adjectival Theory of Matter: F. P. Hoskyn. No. 25. December 4. *De Anima*—Psychology and Science: Richard McKeon. Religious Experience and Metaphysical Speculation: H. M. Kallen. Vol. XXVIII. No. 1. January 1. Science and Philosophy: Wm. E. Ritter. No. 2. January 15: Mr. Lovejoy's Counter-Revolution (I): Arthur E. Murphy.
- PSYCHE.** Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Published quarterly. Price: 5s.
- No. 42. October, 1930. Aspects Suspect—Basic for the Far East—For India: Editorial. The Syncropick: The Orthological Institute. Analysis and Interpretation: J. Wisdom. Shyness: Maurice B. Wright. Modern Anthropology and the Theory of Cultural Compulsives: V. F. Calverton. Movement and Types in Children: C. L. C. Burns. Physiological Behavior-Reactions in the Individual and the Community: Trigant Burrow. Is there a "Time" Sense?: A. O. Jones. The Psychology of Sea-Sickness: C. A. Claremont.
- THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.** Edited by John Dewey and Carl Murchison. Clark University Press. Price: 7 dollars per annum.
- Vol. I. No. 4. November, 1930. The Relative Value of Vocabulary and Sentence Practice for Language Learning: Stevenson Smith and Francis F. Powers. A Study of the Minnesota Rating Scale for Measuring Inferiority Attitudes: Hannah F. Fatereson. A Study of Temperament and Blood Groups: Tokeji Furukawa. A Study of Play in relation to Pubescence: Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty. Short Articles and Notes.
- L'ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE.** Edited by Henri Piéron. Paris: Félix Alcan. Two volumes complete: 120 francs.
- Vol. XXX (1929). La dissociation des douleurs cutanées et la différenciation des conducteurs algiques: H. Piéron. Les associations

locales et la loi de fixation des images : M. Foucault. Etude d'un test d'imagination sur des écoliers parisiens : A. G. Koht. Sur la variation de l'énergie lumineuse et de l'acuité visuelle en fonction de la durée : G. Durup et A. Fessard. De la sommation spatiale des impressions lumineuses au niveau de la fovea : H. Piéron. Etude expérimentale sur l'habileté motrice : Renée Leurquin. Contribution à l'étude de l'apprentissage : D. Heller-Kowarski et Marcel François. Une expérience sur l'apprentissage dans le test de barrage : A. Chweitzer. There is also the usual comprehensive list of competent bibliographical analyses.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Edited by Ed. Claparède. Geneva, Kundig. Price per number : 5 francs.

Vol. XXII. No. 98. July, 1930. Recherches sur les formes d'intelligence : Richard Meili. Contribution à l'étude de l'illusion de poids chez les anormaux : André Rey. L'échelle canadienne de composition française : Jeanne Alphonse et Pierre Bovet.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London. Price : 30s. per annum.

Vol. XI. Part 4. October, 1930. The Technique of Psycho-Analysis : Ella Freeman Sharpe. The Rôle of Psychotic Mechanisms in Cultural Development : Melitta Schmideberg. Fetishism in *Statu Nascendi* : A. S. Lorand. The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis : Sandor Ferenczi. The Femininity-Complex in Men : Felix Boehm. Introduction to the Study of Psycho-Analytical Theory : Edward Glover. One Component of the Fear of Death in Infancy : J. Hárnik. A Form of Defence : Sigmund Pfeifer.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Edited by Professor M. Levi-Bianchini. Nocera Inferiore (Salerno-Campania), Italy. Official Organ of the Italian Psycho-Analytic Society. Published quarterly. Annual subscription : 8 dollars.

Vol. XI. No. 2. August, 1930. Virilismo prosopopilar e androfanía nella donna alienata : M. Levi-Bianchini. I "Sei Personaggi in cerca di autore" di Pirandello : Enrico Morpurgo. Sulla sopravvivenza dell'impulso materno in antiche dementi nubili vergini : Jacopo Nardi. Il corpo umano considerato come un circuito di radio e come un oscillatore ad alta frequenza : Nicola Brunori e Samuele Torrisi. Moderne conoscenze sull'apparato reticolare interno di Golgi : Aldo Defrise. No. 3. October, 1930. Aforismi psicoanalitici ed altri : M. Levi-Bianchini. Contributi alla storia della simbolistica sessuale nell'arte erotica : M. Levi-Bianchini. La psicoanalisi ed i nuovi orientamenti della pedagogia : Hans Zulliger. L'indirizzamento clinico e psicologico concreto nello studio dei criminali : Francesco del Greco. Le alterazioni del carattere nel cocainismo cronico : G. Santangelo.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Published by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Sacred Heart. Milan : Piazza S. Ambrogio 9. Subscription : L. 40-30.

Vol. XXII. No. 5. September-October, 1930. Sulla critica al determinismo dei fenomeni fisici : Paolo Rossi. Percezionismo immediato e realismo critico : Giuseppe Zamboni. La soluzione Abelardiana del problema degli universali : R. Martini.

ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price : 5s.

Vol. VI. No. 11. November, 1930. The Effect of the Living Wage Policy on Wages for Skill : D. T. Sawkins. The Restoration of Economic Equilibrium—Banking and Currency in New Zealand : B. C. Ashwin. The Problem of the Budget : F. A. Bland. Distribution of Income in New Zealand : A. G. B. Fisher. Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry : F. R. E. Mauldon. The Sales Tax : Herbert Burton.

PHILOSOPHISCHER WELTANZEIGER. International Organ for Present-Day Philosophy. Edited by Paul Feldkeller, Schönwalde (Niederbarnim) bei Berlin. Price per annum (including 6 numbers): 4s.

Vol. III. No. 2. Der neue Hegelianismus in Holland: B. Wigersma (Haarlem). Hegel-Kongress and Hegel-Weltbund: The Editor. Das orientalische und das okzidentale Denken: Prof. H. Minami (Tokio). Der Neuhegelianismus in Italien (*continued*): Prof. Antonio Aliotta (Naples). Völkerpsychologische Kontraste unter geopsychischem Gesichtspunkt: Dr. Walther Rauschenberger. Der Einfluss Kants auf die Gesetzgebung Oesterreichs: Dr. Ernst Swoboda. This small newspaper-like journal with its authoritative articles from all over the world and upon current congresses and movements is commended to our readers. One gets to know very quickly from it what is going on, and the price is very low.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Honolulu. Price: 25 cents a copy.

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ARCHIVOS BRASILEIROS DE HYGIENE MENTAL. Official Organ of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene. Praca Floriania, No. 7, Rio de Janeiro. Published monthly. Price: 20s. per annum.

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MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORTS. His Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

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